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I. INTRODUCTION  
Unlike the other contributions to this excellent Symposium, this Article 
looks at state constitutional law in a single state—Ohio—and focuses on the 
history of constitutional revision in it.1 Consistent with the Symposium’s 
theme of popular constitutionalism,2 the Article reviews the expansion—albeit 
the slow expansion—of the groups that were permitted to participate in the 
political process in Ohio as well as the expansion and use of the tools available 
to those seeking constitutional change. As for the substantive constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 1 In some states, “revision” and “amendment” are terms of art with distinct legal 
implications. See generally infra Part XII.C.2. Nonetheless, this Article will generally use 
the terms interchangeably. 
2 See generally Jeffrey S. Sutton, Introduction, State Constitutions in the United 
States Federal System 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (2016) (outlining themes and topics of the 
2015 Ohio State Law Journal Symposium on State Constitutional Law). 
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changes that have taken place in Ohio, the Article reviews them summarily, 
primarily to put the topic of constitutional revision in context. 
To understand constitutional revision in a single state, it is helpful to know 
what is happening in other states, and this Article places Ohio in a national 
context. But its primary purpose is to provide a clear review of the history of 
constitutional change in Ohio. And given its single-state focus as well as its 
attempt to provide a straightforward explanation of the development of the 
Ohio Constitution, it is hoped that this Article will be useful not simply to 
academics but also to all who are interested in the Ohio Constitution, in how it 
has evolved, and in how change is likely to take place in the future. 
The writing of the history of the constitution of a single state is a daunting 
task, and the full story cannot be told without an examination of the social, 
economic, and political currents of the day. And the history of the constitution 
of any state cannot be undertaken without a review of the role of the courts. 
These are projects for another day.3 Instead, this Article focuses more 
narrowly on the expansion of the players in constitutional revision, on the 
expanding toolkit for constitutional revision in Ohio and on the uses to which 
the tools, including state constitutional revision commissions, have been put.  
II. AN OVERVIEW: THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE TOOLS FOR 
REVISION 
First, a snapshot. Today, Ohio operates under its 165-year-old 1851 
Constitution, the sixth oldest in the nation and the second oldest outside New 
England.4 With approximately 56,800 words,5 the Ohio Constitution is the 
                                                                                                                     
 3 There are many excellent histories of Ohio, but none focus comprehensively on the 
history of the Ohio Constitution. See CHARLES B. GALBREATH, HISTORY OF OHIO (1925) (5 
volumes); THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO (Carl Wittke ed., 1941) (6 volumes); 
EMILIUS O. RANDALL & DANIEL J. RYAN, HISTORY OF OHIO (1912) (5 volumes); EUGENE 
H. ROSEBOOM & FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, A HISTORY OF OHIO (James H. Rodabaugh 
ed., 2d ed. 1967). The history of the Ohio Constitution is reviewed in STEVEN H. 
STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 3–75 (2011). See also 
Barbara A. Terzian, Ohio’s Constitutions: An Historical Perspective, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
357 (2004); Howard McDonald, A Study in Constitution Making—Ohio, 1802–1874 (Apr. 
29, 1916) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the 
University of Cincinnati). 
 4 The constitutions of Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1784), Vermont 
(1793) and Maine (1819) are older than the current Ohio Constitution of 1851, as is the 
Wisconsin Constitution (1848). The Indiana Constitution, like the Ohio Constitution, was 
ratified in 1851, but it did not become effective until November 1, 1851. See John Dinan, 
State Constitutional Developments in 2014, in BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, at 3, 11 (2015), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Dinan%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/C36C-
KCJN]. The Ohio Constitution was ratified on June 17, 1851, and became effective on 
September 1, 1851. See OHIO CONST. sched., § 9 (1851). The 1802 Ohio Constitution and 
the 1851 Ohio Constitution are reprinted in ISAAC FRANKLIN PATTERSON, THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF OHIO 73–97, 117–58 (1912). 
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tenth longest in the nation, and Ohio voters have amended it 169 times since 
1851.6  
Ohio has a full toolkit for revising its constitution. Like virtually all states, 
Ohio permits its legislature to propose amendments to the voters for approval 
and permits its legislature to propose constitutional conventions to the 
electorate.7 Where Ohio differs from most states is its commitment to direct 
democracy and its guarantee that voters will be asked periodically whether to 
have a state constitutional convention. Ohio is one of sixteen states that 
currently have a direct constitutional initiative in which voters by petition can 
propose amendments directly to the electorate8 and one of fourteen states that 
have a mandatory convention call.9 Finally, like most states, Ohio requires 
only a simple majority vote for approval of constitutional amendments 
regardless of how the amendment was proposed.10 
When these methods of constitutional revision are looked at cumulatively, 
Ohio is one of only five states—the others being Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, and Oklahoma—that have all four devices: legislatively proposed 
amendments, legislatively proposed conventions, a direct constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 5 The Ohio Constitution had 53,239 words as of the end of 2014. See Table 1.1: 
General Information on State Constitutions, in BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, supra note 4,  
at 11, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/1.1%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M3MQ-B7Y5] [hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, Table 1.1] (reporting based on a 
submission from the author of this Article). The approval of one constitutional amendment 
in 2014 (which is not included in the above total) and two in 2015 increased the Ohio word 
count to approximately 56,800 words. 
 6 See Ohio Constitution—Law and History: Statistical Tables of Amendments 
Proposed and Adopted, CLEV.-MARSHALL L. LIBR., http://guides.law.csuohio.edu/ohio 
constitution/ohioconstitutionstatisticaltables [https://perma.cc/KZ4Z-YRJ8] (last updated 
Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Statistical Tables of Amendments]. 
 7 Table 1.2: Constitutional Amendment Procedure: By the Legislature, in BOOK OF 
THE STATES 2015, supra note 4, at 13, 13–14, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/ 
files/1.2%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF5B-H4X9] [hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES 
2015, Table 1.2]. 
 8 See Table 1.3: Constitutional Amendment Procedure: By Initiative, in BOOK OF THE 
STATES 2015, supra note 4, at 15, 15, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/ 
1.3%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VK7-74FZ] [hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, 
Table 1.3]. Two states—Massachusetts and Mississippi—have indirect constitutional 
initiatives in which proposed constitutional amendments are presented to the state 
legislature before they can be presented to the voters. Id. 
 9 Table 1.4: Procedures for Calling Constitutional Conventions, in BOOK OF THE 
STATES 2015, supra note 4, at 16, 16, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/ 
1.4%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V3Z-NDWH] [hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, 
Table 1.4]. See generally John Dinan, The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State 
Constitutional Convention Referendums: Lessons from the 2000s Regarding Obstacles and 
Pathways to Their Passage, 71 MONT. L. REV. 395 (2010); Robert J. Martineau, The 
Mandatory Referendum on Calling a State Constitutional Convention: Enforcing the 
People’s Right to Reform Their Government, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 421 (1970). 
 10 BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, Table 1.2, supra note 7, at 13; BOOK OF THE STATES 
2015, Table 1.3, supra note 8, at 15. 
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initiative, and a mandatory convention call.11 And, as discussed more fully 
below, Ohio has embraced the use of constitutional revision commissions as 
an alternative to constitutional conventions. 
Ohio had three successful constitutional conventions during the 110-year 
period from 1802 to 1912, with each convention expanding the tools available 
for revising the constitution and addressing the issue of who participates in the 
political process. These conventions took place during or near each of the 
three major periods of state constitutional revision in this country: the 
Founding Era, the Jacksonian Era, and the Progressive Era.  
The Constitutional Convention of 1802, which took place after the 
Founding Era, adopted the 1802 Constitution, which moved Ohio forward on 
the path to statehood and permitted it to become the seventeenth state. 
However, it adopted a flawed constitution that embraced legislative 
supremacy, that placed unreasonable burdens on the judiciary, that 
constitutionalized gender and racial restrictions on voting, and that was almost 
impervious to change.12 
The Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1850–1851, which was held near 
the end of the Jacksonian Era, proposed the current constitution, which 
corrected many of the defects of the 1802 Constitution. It “re-calibrated” the 
relationship among the three branches of government, ended the era of 
legislative supremacy, made the judiciary independent of the legislature, 
expanded the role of the people in the political process, and made major 
expansions in the tools available for constitutional revision. However, the 
1850–1851 Convention made no significant changes in suffrage.13 
Ohio’s third significant constitutional event, though its fourth convention, 
the Progressive-Era Constitutional Convention of 1912, did not propose a new 
constitution but rather proposed forty-two separate amendments. The voters 
approved thirty-four of them, including the adoption of an omnibus 
amendment embracing direct democracy—the direct constitutional initiative, 
the indirect statutory initiative, and the referendum—as well as important 
change in the rules for counting votes on amendments proposed by the General 
Assembly, but it did not extend suffrage to women.14 
There have been no conventions or even serious efforts to call a 
convention in the last century, and constitutional revision in Ohio has been 
characterized by a century of ad hoc constitutional change, punctuated by two 
experiments with commission-based constitutional revision, the second of 
which is taking place today. 
                                                                                                                     
 11 In addition to the direct constitutional initiative, Ohio has other tools of direct 
democracy, including the indirect statutory initiative and the referendum. See OHIO CONST. 
art. II, § 1(b)–(c). The focus of this Article is on constitutional revision. 
 12 See Randolph C. Downes, Ohio’s Second Constitution, 25 NW. OHIO Q. 71, 71 
(1953) (“The difficulty with Ohio’s first constitution as adopted in 1802 was that it was 
practically unamendable.”). 
 13 See STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 34–39.  
 14 See id. at 47–55. 
286 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
III. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE AND THE PATH TO STATEHOOD 
The important role Ohio plays in the political life of the nation began prior 
to its admission as the nation’s seventeenth state. On July 13, 1787, the 
Confederation Congress (formally known as the United States in Congress 
Assembled) adopted the Ordinance of 1787, popularly known as the 
Northwest Ordinance,15 to establish the framework “for the government of the 
territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio.”16 Subsequently 
“reenacted” by the first United States Congress in 1789,17 the Northwest 
Ordinance created the road map that was initially designed to permit between 
three and five states to join the new nation on an “equal footing with the 
original States,”18 setting the pattern for the admission of thirty-one of the fifty 
states.19 Ultimately, five new states (and a small portion of a sixth) were 
carved out of the Northwest Territory, following the path created by the 
Northwest Ordinance. This path to statehood included a stint at territorial 
governance when the Territory reached a population threshold of 5,000 “free 
male inhabitants” and the adoption of a permanent constitution and 
government that was “republican, and in conformity to the principles” of the 
Northwest Ordinance.20  
Initially, the Northwest Ordinance provided that the Territory would be 
governed by a governor, a secretary, and three judges appointed by the 
Confederation Congress.21 On October 5, 1787, Congress appointed Arthur St. 
Clair as Governor of the Territory.22 When the population reached the 5,000 
threshold, a General Assembly was to be created, consisting of the governor, a 
legislative council,23 and a House of Representatives. The House of 
Representatives consisted of one elected representative for every 500 free male 
inhabitants up to a maximum of twenty-five members.24 To qualify as an 
elector, a “man” had to have been a resident of the district, had to have a 
                                                                                                                     
 15 See Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 929–31, 929–30 nn.6–7 (1995). 
 16 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, pmbl., reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at LVII–LIX (2012). 
 17 In 1789, the first United States Congress reenacted the Northwest Ordinance in 
virtually the same form. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. 
 18 Northwest Ordinance, supra note 16, § 14, art. V. 
 19 See Duffey, supra note 15, at 929–30. 
 20 Northwest Ordinance, supra note 16, § 9; id. § 14, art. V. 
 21 Id. §§ 3–4. 
 22 This appointment by the Confederation Congress was pursuant to the authority in 
section 3 of the Northwest Ordinance. Id. § 3. St. Clair continued in this position until 
President Jefferson removed him on November 22, 1802, in response of intemperate 
comments that St. Clair made at the Constitutional Convention. See ALFRED BYRON SEARS, 
THOMAS WORTHINGTON: FATHER OF OHIO STATEHOOD 97 (1958). 
 23 The legislative council had three members appointed by Congress from a list of ten 
persons nominated by the House of Representatives. See Northwest Ordinance, supra note 
16, § 11. 
 24 Id. § 9. 
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“freehold in fifty acres of land in the district,” and had to be either “a citizen of 
one of the States, and [a] resident in the district” or (presumably if a 
noncitizen) a two-year resident of the district.25 Thus, the franchise was not 
expressly limited to whites or to citizens of the United States; both citizens and 
noncitizens apparently voted, and there is even evidence that some non-whites 
voted.26 On the other hand, women were doubly barred from voting by virtue 
of the gender and freehold requirements.  
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Bill of Rights limited the 
power of the states to determine who could participate in the political life of 
the new country, and states had effectively been delegated the power to 
determine who could vote.27 The common pattern among the original thirteen 
states and the three new states admitted prior to the admission of Ohio was to 
condition the franchise on property ownership, although taxpayer status was 
sufficient to permit a male to be an elector in a few states.28 
The Northwest Ordinance contained the requirements for moving the three 
states that comprised what might be called the lower Northwest Territory to 
statehood when each met a population threshold of 60,000 “free inhabitants.”29 
Congress also provided that it could carve two additional states in the northern 
portion of the Northwest Territory (essentially what became Michigan and 
Wisconsin), and it expressly acknowledged that the process of admission 
could begin before the population threshold was met.30 To be admitted to the 
Union, aspiring states were required to adopt a permanent constitution and 
state government that conformed to republican principles.31 
An effort to slow down statehood for Ohio and thus aid the Federalists was 
led by Arthur St. Clair, a former President of the Confederation Congress32 
                                                                                                                     
 25 Id. 
 26 See Terzian, supra note 3, at 359 & n.15. 
 27 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.”). 
 28 Prior to the Revolutionary War, seven of the thirteen colonies required that men 
own land of a specified acreage or monetary value in order to participate in elections; in 
other colonies ownership of personal property of a designated value could substitute for 
real estate. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2000). Prior to the enactment of the Northwest 
Ordinance, eleven of the thirteen colonies had a property ownership requirement, while 
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania allowed for the payment of a poll, county or state tax. 
See id. tbl.A.1. 
 29 Northwest Ordinance, supra note 16, § 14, art. V.  
 30 Id. (“[S]o far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the confederacy, 
such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there may be a less number 
of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.”).  
 31 Id. 
 32 St. Clair was President of the Confederation Congress from February 2, 1787, until 
his appointment as Governor of the Northwest Territory, during which time the 
Confederation Congress approved the Northwest Ordinance. See supra note 22; see also 1 
WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 117 (1882); supra note 16. 
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and the controversial, autocratic Federalist Governor of the Northwest 
Territory.33 The veto-prone St. Clair, who had made many enemies in the 
Northwest Territory, and his allies in Cincinnati and Marietta attempted to 
divide what would become Ohio into two smaller states, thus delaying 
statehood and pushing aside the ambitions of those who sought to make 
Chillicothe the capital of the new state.34 
Not surprisingly, Congress and the Jefferson Administration rejected St. 
Clair’s efforts.35 On April 30, 1802, President Jefferson signed the Enabling 
Act for Ohio,36 despite the fact that the state’s population fell short of the 
60,000 population threshold contemplated by the Northwest Ordinance. The 
purpose of the Enabling Act was “to enable the people of the Eastern division 
of the territory northwest of the river Ohio to form a constitution and state 
government, and for the admission of such state into the Union, on an equal 
footing with the original States.”37  
Why the rush? The emerging leadership in what would become Ohio 
wanted very badly to get rid of the despised Arthur St. Clair, but obtaining 
statehood was even more important.38 And the Democratic–Republicans and 
President Jefferson wanted to strengthen their hand in Congress.39 After all, 
the initially stalemated presidential election of 1800, which was resolved in the 
House of Representatives, had highlighted the importance to President 
Jefferson of a sympathetic Congress.40 
The Enabling Act defined the boundaries of the new state41 and set up the 
process for electing delegates who would determine “whether it be or be not 
expedient at that time to form a constitution and state government for the 
people, within the said territory” and, if expedient, “form a constitution and 
state government.” The Act further provided that the state government “shall 
be republican, and not repugnant to the ordinance.”42  
No doubt because of their antipathy toward St. Clair, the drafters of the 
Enabling Act did not leave many decisions to him nor to chance. The Act 
accepted the date selected by the Territorial Legislature for the election of 
delegates, apportioned thirty-five delegates among the nine counties included 
within the territory, and specified the date and place for the constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 33 See generally STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 10–14. 
 34 See generally SEARS, supra note 22, at 51–52, 73–77. 
 35 See id. at 81–85.  
 36 Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173 [hereinafter Enabling Act]. 
 37 Id. at pmbl., 2 Stat. at 173.  
 38 See SEARS, supra note 22, at 79–81. 
 39 See Randolph Chandler Downes, Thomas Jefferson and the Removal of Governor 
St. Clair in 1802, 36 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. Q. 62, 66 (1927). 
 40 The 1800 election was ultimately resolved in the House of Representatives with the 
states voting as states. See generally JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE 
TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800 (2004). 
 41 Enabling Act § 2. 
 42 Id. § 5.  
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convention.43 The Enabling Act also made clear who could vote for delegates 
by dropping the freehold requirement of the Northwest Ordinance, but it 
expressly limited the franchise to “male citizens of the United States, 
who . . . shall have paid a territorial or county tax.”44 
Finally, the Act said nothing about the procedures for ratifying a new 
constitution, but this is not surprising given the fact that the policy of holding 
ratification votes on proposed constitutions was rare in the eighteenth 
century.45  
IV. THE 1802 CONVENTION AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
A. The 1802 Constitution 
“The last quarter of the eighteenth century was a period of intense 
constitution-making” and “[b]y 1800, the sixteen states that comprised the 
Union had adopted twenty-four constitutions.”46 Ohio was the first state in the 
nineteenth century to adopt a state constitution, and virtually everything about 
Ohio’s first constitutional convention Constitution was rushed. The eastern 
division of the Northwest Territory had not met the “60,000 free inhabitants” 
population threshold of the Northwest Ordinance, but President Jefferson and 
his allies in Ohio and Washington badly wanted another sympathetic state in 
Congress. 
The Enabling Act required an election for thirty-five delegates from nine 
counties on October 12, 1802, and the convening of the convention a scant 
twenty days later.47 Thus, on November 1, 1802, the delegates met in 
Chillicothe, and in the space of twenty-five working days hammered out a 
constitution for the new state.48  
                                                                                                                     
 43 Id. §§ 4–5.  
 44 Id. § 4 (“[A]ll male citizens of the United States, who shall have arrived at full age, 
and resided within the said territory at least one year previous to the day of election, and 
shall have paid a territorial or county tax, and all persons having in other respects, the legal 
qualifications to vote for representatives in the general assembly of the territory, be, and 
they are hereby authorized to choose representatives to form a convention . . . .”).  
 45 See WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
62–64 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1910) (reviewing state policies on the submission of new 
constitutions to the voters in the eighteenth century and noting that “before 1784 only those 
[constitutions] of New Hampshire and Massachusetts were formally submitted to a vote of 
the people”); see also G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 30 n.1 
(1998) (“Since the 1820s, it has been standard practice to submit proposed state 
constitutions to the state electorate for ratification.”). 
 46 TARR, supra note 45, at 60. 
 47 Enabling Act § 4. 
 48 There is no transcript of Ohio’s 1802 Constitutional Convention, but the journal 
identifies the issues that the convention addressed and shows that the convention did not 
meet on Sundays, thus leaving the convention twenty-five working days to complete its 
task. See Journal of the Convention (1802), reprinted as First Constitutional Convention, 
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The new constitution rejected a strong executive in favor of what could 
fairly be called a system of legislative supremacy. Borrowing liberally from 
constitutions adopted in 1790 by Pennsylvania, in 1796 by Tennessee and in 
1799 by Kentucky, but especially Tennessee49 (and also influenced by their 
experiences with Governor St. Clair), the delegates adopted a constitution that 
created a weak governor without the veto power and with only a limited power 
of appointment. The governor was responsible for appointing the adjutant 
general, for filling vacancies when the General Assembly was in recess, for 
serving as the commander-in-chief of the militia, and for granting pardons and 
reprieves.50 There was also an early form of gubernatorial term limits—six 
years in any eight-year period.51 
The bicameral General Assembly, on the other hand, had few limitations 
on its plenary power. Representatives were elected for one-year terms 
(presumably making them closer to the people), and Senators were elected for 
two-year terms.52 However, there were no limits on the number of terms that 
legislators could serve. The General Assembly had a broad power of 
appointment, including the secretary of state, the state treasurer, the state 
auditor, and all judges except justices of the peace.53 It also had unrestricted 
power to apportion seats in the General Assembly, the power within limits to 
fix the number of seats in the House and Senate,54 and the power to create new 
counties.55 
The judges serving on the Supreme Court and the courts of common pleas 
were appointed by a joint ballot of both Houses of the General Assembly for 
seven-year terms,56 but the Supreme Court was effectively hobbled by circuit-
riding responsibility that required it to hold court annually in each county.57 
Such a requirement might have been appropriate in 1802 in a rural state that 
had nine counties, but (as soon became apparent) it would not work for a 
rapidly growing state in which the General Assembly had broad power to 
create new counties.58  
                                                                                                                     
Convened November 1, 1802, in 5 OHIO ARCHAEOLOGICAL & HIST. Q. 80, 80 (1897) 
[hereinafter Journal of the 1802 Convention]. 
 49 JOHN D. BARNHART, VALLEY OF DEMOCRACY: THE FRONTIER VERSUS THE 
PLANTATION IN THE OHIO VALLEY 1775–1818, at 157–58 (1953). 
 50 OHIO CONST. art. II (1802). 
 51 Id. art. II, § 3.  
 52 Id. art. I, §§ 3, 5. 
 53 Id. art. II, § 16 (Secretary of State); id. art. VI, § 2 (State Treasurer and Auditor); id. 
art. III, § 8 (judges). 
 54 Id. art. I, §§ 2, 6 (apportionment). 
 55 Id. art. VII, § 3 (new counties). 
 56 OHIO CONST. art. III, § 8 (1802) (judges). 
 57 Id. art. III, § 10 (circuit riding). 
 58 See Downes, supra note 12, at 72. 
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B. Popular Constitutionalism 
On the three large issues that implicated the role of the people—political 
participation, ratification, and constitutional change—broadly speaking, what 
can be seen as popular constitutionalism—the results of the 1802 Constitution 
were mixed. 
1. Political Participation 
The 1802 Constitution included three provisions that addressed who could 
participate in the political process. First, it dropped the references to “citizens” 
that were used to define electors in both the Northwest Ordinance and the 
Enabling Act, thus seeming to expand the franchise to noncitizens.59 Second, it 
continued the liberalization of property qualifications for voting begun by the 
Enabling Act by not including a freehold requirement. However, it still limited 
the franchise to those “who have paid or are charged with a State or county 
tax” or are “compelled to labor on the roads of their respective townships or 
counties”,60 an expansion that future United States Supreme Court Justice 
Salmon P. Chase in his 1833 history of Ohio characterized as “universal 
suffrage.”61 And third, in its most controversial action, the delegates rejected 
African-American suffrage by only one vote when the President of the 
convention Edward Tiffin, who was to become Ohio’s first governor, left the 
chair and cast a tie-breaking vote to defeat African-American suffrage by a 
18–17 margin.62 In adopting a racial restriction for voting by expressly 
limiting the franchise to “white male inhabitants,” the delegates made Ohio the 
first northern state to include a racial restriction on voting in its constitution.63 
2. Ratification 
The Enabling Act neither required nor prohibited popular ratification. On 
November 3, 1802, the third day of deliberations, the delegates by a 32–1 
margin had voted to form a constitution and a state government.64 Judge 
                                                                                                                     
 59 But see Johnston v. England (1817), reprinted in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1823, at 149, 149–59 (Ervin H. Pollack ed., 1952) (unreported Ohio 
Supreme Court decision interpreting this provision against the background of well-
established principles and holding that the language was not sufficiently clear to reject a 
statute that denied noncitizens the right to vote).  
 60 OHIO CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 5 (1802). 
 61 Salmon P. Chase, A Preliminary Sketch of the History of Ohio, in 1 THE STATUTES 
OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 9, 34 (Salmon P. Chase ed., 1833) (“All 
elections are by ballot and by universal suffrage.”).  
 62 Terzian, supra note 3, at 368. 
 63 G. Alan Tarr, The Ohio Constitution of 1802: An Introduction 4 (unpublished 
manuscript), https://statecon.camden.rutgers.edu/sites/statecon/files/publications/ohio.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DKA-TTL8] (quoting OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1802)). 
 64 Journal of the 1802 Convention, supra note 48, at 88. 
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Ephraim Cutler, a Federalist delegate from Washington County, was the only 
delegate to vote in opposition, but on the final day of the convention he joined 
all the delegates in unanimously ratifying the constitution.65 Earlier in the 
proceedings, Cutler had moved to have the new constitution submitted to the 
voters for their approval. The adoption of state constitutions without 
submission to state voters was still a common practice at the time,66 and the 
pro-statehood delegates were not interested in delay. In a 27–7 vote on 
November 13, 1802, the pro-statehood delegates rejected Cutler’s proposal.67  
3. Constitutional Change 
The 1802 Constitution provided that the voters had “at all times a 
complete power to alter, reform or abolish their government, whenever they 
may deem necessary.”68 But short of revolution or what has been called a 
“circumvention convention,”69 the only provision on structured constitutional 
change was the section permitting the General Assembly to propose a 
convention to the voters by a two-thirds vote. The voters would then have the 
opportunity, by a majority of those voting for members of the Ohio House of 
Representatives, to approve a convention.70 This provision was silent on the 
procedures that a convention would be required to follow, and it said nothing 
about whether a successor constitution would have to be submitted to the 
voters for their approval.71  
On February 19, 1803, Congress recognized Ohio’s adoption of a 
constitution and formation of a government,72 thus making Ohio the 
seventeenth state in the Union and the first state carved out of the Northwest 
Territory. 
                                                                                                                     
 65 Id. at 128. 
 66 See supra note 45. 
 67 Journal of the 1802 Convention, supra note 48, at 98. 
 68 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1802). 
 69 See George Phillip Parkinson, Jr., Antebellum State Constitution-Making: 
Retention, Circumvention, Revision 144 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin) (on file with author). 
 70 The supermajority requirement for votes on convention calls remained in the Ohio 
Constitution until 1912. See infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text. 
 71 OHIO CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1802). 
 72 On February 19, 1803, Congress adopted “[a]n Act to provide for the due execution 
of the laws of the United States, within the State of Ohio” in which it recognized that the 
people of Ohio did “form for themselves a constitution and state government” pursuant to 
the enabling act and noted that “the said state has become one of the United States of 
America.” Act of Feb. 19, 1803, ch. 60, 2 Stat. 202, 202–03.  
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V. THE EXPERIENCE UNDER THE 1802 CONSTITUTION 
A. The Effort to Reform the First Constitution 
Ohio’s first constitution may have been well-suited for a rural state with 
only nine counties and less than 45,000 people. It did not, however, meet the 
needs of a state that had experienced meteoric growth, expanding to 230,760 
people and thirty-six counties by 1810 and to almost two million people and 
eighty-seven counties by 1850, when it was the young nation’s third largest 
state.73 
Concerns about the operation of the 1802 Constitution built up slowly but 
inexorably. Ironically, these concerns did not initially focus on the 
concentration of power in the General Assembly, but rather on the inability of 
the General Assembly to address caseload and other problems with the 
judiciary.74 In 1817, Governor Thomas Worthington, Ohio’s sixth governor 
and an influential member of the 1802 Constitutional Convention, urged the 
holding a convention, as did his successor, Governor Ethan Allen Brown, the 
following year.75 
In 1818, by the requisite two-thirds vote in each house the General 
Assembly voted to put a convention call on the ballot. The 1802 Constitution 
had embedded a supermajority voting requirement on the convention call by 
requiring the call be approved by a majority of those voting for members of 
the Ohio House of Representative. However, on October 12, 1819, the voters 
rejected the call by a vote of 29,315 to 6,987,76 an action one commentator 
characterized as reflecting the continued satisfaction with the constitution.77  
Still, all was not well. Interest in revision of the state constitution 
increased as a result of the financial crises that began with the Panic of 1837,78 
and in 1838, Caleb Atwater, in the first book-length history of Ohio, identified 
many problems with the constitution, especially those relating to the great 
power in the hands of the General Assembly. Atwater expressed his surprise 
“that no efforts have yet been made, to obtain, the greatest and principal 
amendment, imperiously demanded, if we wish for permanency of a 
republican form of government, in Ohio.”79 Atwater acknowledged the 
                                                                                                                     
 73 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TECH. INFO. SERV., DECENNIAL CENSUS OF 
POPULATION, 1800 TO 2000, BY COUNTY (Mar. 2001). 
 74 McDonald, supra note 3, at 62. 
 75 Id. at 63. 
 76 PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 161–62; see also Ohio Constitution—Law and 
History: Calls for Conventions, CLEV.-MARSHALL L. LIBR., http://guides.law.csuohio.edu/ 
ohioconstitution/callsconventions [https://perma.cc/C47S-Z6FF] (last updated Feb. 26, 
2016) [hereinafter Calls for Conventions]. 
 77 See Parkinson, supra note 69, at 145. 
 78 See generally FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE PASSING OF THE FRONTIER STATE, 
1803–1850, in 3 THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO, supra note 3, at 328–62 (discussing 
the Panic of 1837 and its aftermath). 
 79 CALEB ATWATER, A HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO 172 (2d ed. 1838). 
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difficulty of amending the constitution, but he suggested that amendments be 
placed “before the people, article by article.”80 There was no express authority 
under the Ohio Constitution for conventions placing limited constitutional 
revision on the ballot, and Atwater did not discuss whether his proposal could 
be implemented. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that Atwater’s specific 
suggestion gained any traction, though support for a new convention continued 
to build through the 1840s.  
The movement for constitutional change in Ohio took place during what 
Professor Alan Tarr, a participant in this Symposium,81 has colorfully 
described as the “orgy of nineteenth-century constitution-making” that swept 
the country.82 Between 1830 and 1850, sixteen of the twenty-eight states in the 
Union (excluding Ohio) held constitutional conventions that resulted in the 
adopting of initial or new constitutions. Eight of these states adopted their first 
constitutions83 while the other eight states held conventions to adopt new or 
revised constitutions.84 Thus, on the eve of Ohio’s 1850–1851 convention, 
more than half the states had held constitutional conventions during the prior 
two decades.85 As in Ohio, the people of many of these states had experienced 
severe economic problems resulting in overspending for internal 
improvements, bank failures, and the profligate use of the state’s credit; also 
like Ohioans, the people generally blamed their legislatures for these economic 
woes.86  
Interest in constitutional revision and concerns about the legislative branch 
in Ohio began to peak in the 1840s. Support for the Jeffersonian ideal—trust in 
the legislative branch, the branch of government closest to the people—began 
to wane, and the people no longer trusted the General Assembly. 
Most of the popular concerns involved fiscal issues, including adoption of 
new forms of taxation, heavy state borrowing, expenditures, special tax breaks, 
and other subsidies for banks and canal, turnpike, and railroad companies. 
These concerns were exacerbated by the continued fallout from the Panic of 
                                                                                                                     
 80 Id. at 175. 
81 See generally G. Alan Tarr, Popular Constitutionalism in State and Nation, 77 
OHIO ST. L.J. 237 (2016). 
 82 TARR, supra note 45, at 97. 
 83 These include Rhode Island (1842); Arkansas (1836); California (1849); Florida 
(1839); Iowa (1846); Michigan (1835); Texas (1845); Wisconsin (1848). Rhode Island, one 
of the original 13 states, had been operating under its Colonial Charter until the adoption of 
its first state constitution in 1842. See BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, Table 1.1, supra note 5, 
at 11. 
 84 New constitutions were adopted in this period in the following states: Delaware 
(1831); New York (1846); Pennsylvania (1938); Virginia (1830); Tennessee (1835); 
Illinois (1848); Louisiana (1845); Mississippi (1832). See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 8–9 (2006). 
 85 See McDonald, supra note 3, at 59 (“While the Ohio convention was in session, 
conventions in five other states were engaged in a similar work.”). 
 86 TARR, supra note 45, at 111–13 (“The main impetus for constitutional change came 
from the economic collapse of 1837, when nine states defaulted on their debts.”). 
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1837; there were also concerns about the legislative process, which was 
characterized by special or private legislation and the adoption of special 
legislation for corporate charters as well as by logrolling, gerrymandering, and 
the wholesale creation of new counties.87 And the judiciary was not able to 
function efficiently with heavy caseloads and a supreme court that had 
burdensome circuit-riding responsibilities.88 
Despite the popular support for a convention, the General Assembly 
refused to approve constitutional calls in 1844, 1846, and 1847.89 During this 
period, “[c]onstitutional reform quickly became the leading topic of state 
politics.”90 The Democrats supported a convention, and the Democratic press 
“derided the 1802 constitution [and] reiterated standard tenets of [Jefferson’s] 
generational revision theory.”91 Whigs, on the other hand, opposed a 
convention call, and their press derided the Democrats as radicals.92 
Ultimately, it took not only the financial crises of the 1830s, including the 
fiscal abuses of the General Assembly, but also the threat of a circumvention 
convention and a reapportionment fight in Hamilton County in 1840s to break 
the political stalemate.93  
With the support of Whig Governor William Bebb and the Free Soil Party, 
a new political party committed to the abolition of slavery, on March 23, 1849, 
the General Assembly provided the two-thirds vote necessary to put the 
question of holding a constitutional convention on the fall ballot.94 
B. Samuel Medary and the Second Ohio Constitutional Convention 
The issues before the voters on the convention call had been framed, at 
least in part, by the work of the controversial Samuel Medary. Best known for 
his national activities in the 1860s as a Peace Democrat, as a fierce opponent 
of Lincoln’s conduct of the Civil War, as the publisher of the controversial 
anti-war newspaper, Crisis, and for his indictment in 1864 for conspiracy 
against the federal government,95 early in his career Medary had been deeply 
engaged in Ohio politics. A Jacksonian Democrat, he served single terms in 
both the Ohio Senate and the Ohio House in the 1830s, and in 1838 he became 
editor of the Ohio Statesman, the key Democratic newspaper. 
                                                                                                                     
 87 See DAVID M. GOLD, DEMOCRACY IN SESSION: A HISTORY OF THE OHIO GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 214–15 (2009); WEISENBURGER, supra note 78, at 478; Downes, supra note 12, 
at 71–74. 
 88 See WEISENBURGER, supra note 78, at 478; Downes, supra note 12, at 71–72.  
 89 McDonald, supra note 3, at 70. 
 90 Parkinson, supra note 69, at 152.  
 91 Id. at 151. 
 92 Id. at 158–59. 
 93 See id. at 153–62. 
 94 Id. at 162; see also McDonald, supra, note 3, at 71 & n.4.  
 95 See REED W. SMITH, SAMUEL MEDARY & THE CRISIS: TESTING THE LIMITS OF PRESS 
FREEDOM 1–3 (1995). 
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Medary was a zealous supporter of constitutional revision for Ohio. After 
the March 23, 1849 vote to put a convention call on the ballot, he announced 
his plan to publish twenty-six weekly pamphlets, suitable for binding, titled 
The New Constitution.96 True to this commitment, he published weekly 
pamphlets devoted to constitutional revision from May 5, 1849, to November 
17, 1849.97 Strongly criticizing the Ohio Constitution and the abuses of the 
General Assembly and freely sharing stories about constitutional revision in 
other states, Medary sought to reassure Ohioans who might have feared the 
changes that a new constitution might introduce. His “emphasis was a 
response to Whig fears of untried, drastic Democratic ideas. He showed the 
Ohio revision movement would not necessarily bring chaos and an end to ‘law 
and order.’”98 
On October 9, 1849, the voters approved the convention call by a vote of 
145,698 to 89,672 (which included 51,167 “no” votes and 38,505 voters who 
did not vote on the convention call).99 In the final issue of The New 
Constitution, Medary celebrated this outcome and urged his readers to 
continue the fight: “The battle is not yet ended—the friends of Constitutional 
Reform have yet a task to perform, if they would reap the advantages which a 
change of the Constitution offers to the state.”100 
He also warned the friends of constitutional reform that: 
Those who opposed the Convention are untiring in their efforts still to 
defeat a new Constitution. They will seek the suffrages of the people, as 
Delegates to the Convention, and while professing to aid in the formation of a 
new Constitution, they will support such measures, as, if engrafted on the 
Constitution, will ensure its defeat . . . .101 
Finally, he urged his readers to take great care in electing delegates. He 
reminded them of the issues he thought a convention should address, most of 
which concerned the need to curb the General Assembly.102 
On February 22, 1850, pursuant to the vote on the convention call, the 
General Assembly passed an act calling for the election of delegates on April 
1, 1850, and scheduled the convention for May 6, 1850, in Columbus.103  
                                                                                                                     
 96 Samuel Medary, Prospectus of the New Constitution, 1 NEW CONST. 1, 1 (1849).  
 97 Samuel Medary, The End of the Volume—To the Friends of Constitutional Reform, 
1 NEW CONST. 401, 401 (1849). 
 98 Parkinson, supra note 69, at 156–57. 
 99 See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 99. The total votes cast at the election were 
235,370 and 145,698 or 61.9% of the voters supported the convention call, easily meeting 
the supermajority voting requirement. 
 100 Medary, supra note 97, at 401. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See Act of Feb. 22, 1850, 48 Ohio Laws 19, 19. 
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VI. THE 1851 CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVISION IN OHIO 
The Constitution proposed by the 1850–1851 Convention addressed many 
of the substantive defects of the 1802 Constitution. It “re-calibrated” the 
relationship among the three branches of government by placing substantive 
and procedural limitations on the General Assembly.104 It slightly expanded 
the governor’s power but rejected the effort to give the governor the veto 
power.105 Significantly, it gave voters the power to elect officials that 
previously had been selected by the General Assembly, including the Auditor, 
Secretary of State, Treasurer, Attorney General, and both common pleas and 
Ohio Supreme Court judges.106 It also created the new position of an elected 
Lieutenant Governor.107 
The 1851 Constitution did not expand participation in the political process. 
It continued to limit the vote to white males by summarily rejecting efforts to 
extend the franchise to non-whites and to women,108 and it expressly limited 
the franchise to citizens.109 Nonetheless, it broadened the role of white male 
voters in constitutional revision by adopting new methods for amending the 
constitution. It continued the policy of permitting the General Assembly by a 
two-thirds vote to put convention calls on the ballot, but and it adopted a new 
provision requiring that the question of whether to have a convention be 
automatically placed on the ballot every twenty years.110 Finally, it also 
adopted a new provision permitting the General Assembly to propose 
amendments to the voters by a three-fifths vote, and it required that all 
amendments proposed by future conventions be submitted to the voters.111 
A. General Assembly Proposed Conventions 
The policy of permitting the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote to put 
a convention call on the ballot was not controversial, and the proposed 
                                                                                                                     
 104 STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 35–36. 
 105 Id. at 37–38. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. at 34–39; see also Downes, supra note 12, at 72. 
 108 See STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 30–33. 
 109 See OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (1851) (“Every white . . . male citizen of the United 
States, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of the state one year 
next preceding the election, . . . shall . . . be entitled to vote at all elections.”). In the mid-
nineteenth century, a number of states followed the lead of Wisconsin and adopted a two-
step procedure extending the vote to aliens who had declared their intent to become 
citizens. See KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 27. The issue of alien voting was a contested issue 
in the 1850–1851 Convention, but the delegates limited the vote to citizens, thus 
effectively agreeing with 1817 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court limiting the vote to 
citizens. See Johnston v. England (1817), reprinted in POLLACK, supra note 59, at 149–59. 
 110 See OHIO CONST. art. XVI, §§ 2–3 (1851). 
 111 See id. art. XVI, §§ 1, 3. 
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constitution borrowed the substance of this provision from the 1802 
Constitution, including the supermajority requirement for voter approval of the 
call.112 
B. Mandatory Convention Calls 
The proposed constitution contained a new provision requiring the General 
Assembly to put the following question on the ballot every twenty years: 
“Shall there be a convention to revise, alter, or amend the constitution[?]”113 
This proposal was hotly debated. Proponents wanted a method to empower the 
people and eliminate the need to first go through the General Assembly.114 
Mindful of the recent difficulty of getting the General Assembly to act, they 
were not willing to wait another half century before another convention.115 
They wanted each generation to have a chance to act and address the 
fundamentals of the constitution.116 Opponents, on the other hand, objected 
because the proposal took the initiation of constitutional change away from the 
legislature.117  
Mr. Rufus P. Ranney, a delegate from Trumbull County, future Ohio 
Supreme Court Justice, and Chairman of the standing committee on Future 
Amendments to the Constitution, strongly supported the proposed mandatory 
call:  
We calculate that a generation of men passes way about once in twenty years, 
and this therefore is the period that has been fixed upon, for the laws of one to 
pass into the hands of another. I see no objections to such a provision. It is 
right in theory, and if it is right in theory, it will work no wrong in practice. It 
certainly cannot be false to say that each generation is the best judge of what 
institutions are best fitted for its condition; and if it is true, it must be also true 
that no wrong is done either to them or to us, to place it in their power to give 
their assent or dissent to those that exist, and if necessary, to take the earliest, 
easiest and most feasible means, to adapt their institutions to their peculiar 
condition and circumstances.118 
The delegates were aware that a handful of states, including New York in 
its recently adopted 1846 Constitution,119 had adopted mandatory convention 
                                                                                                                     
 112 See id. art. XVI, § 2. 
 113 See id. art. XVI, § 3. 
 114 See 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1850–51, at 429–37 (1851) 
[hereinafter 1850–51 DEBATES]. 
 115 See id. at 428. 
 116 Id. at 430. 
 117 See id. at 429–37. 
 118 Id. at 430.  
 119 Fourteen states currently have mandatory convention calls, but when the 1850–
1851 Convention convened, only New Hampshire, Indiana, and New York had mandatory 
2016] CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION: OHIO STYLE 299 
calls, a device with philosophical roots in the writings of Thomas Jefferson.120 
And one delegate even suggested that “an appeal to the people, once in twenty 
years, would have a salutary effect upon their public character.”121 Some 
delegates, however, were concerned about the need for a mandatory 
convention call, especially in light of the decision to give the General 
Assembly the power to propose amendments directly to the voters.122 Mr. 
Ranney did not buy these arguments, and he sought to assuage the concerns of 
those who expressed concern about voters being forced to vote on convention 
calls by pointing to the supermajority requirement for the vote on convening a 
new constitution. In addition, he stated that “[i]f the people do not need a 
revision of their organic law, all they have to do is not to vote for it. To refrain 
from voting is to vote in the negative.”123  
C. General Assembly Proposed Amendments 
The new constitution also proposed giving the General Assembly the 
power to propose amendments directly to the voters by a three-fifths vote, but 
it subjected such amendments to a supermajority vote requirement.124 There 
was no sentiment expressed in support of eliminating the supermajority 
requirement.125 There was, however, a proposal to permit the General 
Assembly to propose amendments by a bare majority, but this proposal would 
have required legislative approval in two successive sessions.126 After hearing 
the argument from Mr. Ranney that the double assent requirement could 
lengthen the time for an amendment to five years (given Ohio’s commitment 
to biennial legislative sessions), the delegates rejected this proposal.127  
D. Popular Ratification 
The 1802 Constitution had not addressed the issue of popular ratification, 
but the proposed 1851 Constitution contained a provision requiring that no 
amendments to the constitution proposed by a convention “shall take effect, 
until . . . submitted to the electors of the state, and adopted by a majority of 
                                                                                                                     
calls. See BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, Table 1.4, supra note 9, at 16; Dinan, supra note 9, at 
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 120 Dinan, supra note 9, at 398. 
 121 1850–51 DEBATES, supra note 114, at 430.  
 122 See id. at 429–30. 
 123 Id. at 430. 
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 125 McDonald, supra note 3, at 195. 
 126 See 1850–51 DEBATES, supra note 114, at 427–28. 
 127 See McDonald, supra note 3, at 195; see also 1850–51 DEBATES, supra note 114, at 
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those voting thereon.”128 This provision rejected the application of a 
supermajority requirement not only to new constitutions proposed by 
conventions but also to amendments proposed by conventions.129 And this 
rejection of the supermajority requirement for convention-proposed 
amendments would become important in the twentieth century when the 1912 
Convention submitted multiple amendments, but not a new constitution, to the 
voters.130  
Though not required to do so by the 1851 Constitution, the delegates also 
submitted the new constitution to the voters. As part of its legislation 
implementing the vote to hold a convention, the General Assembly had 
adopted a statutory provision requiring the submission of the new constitution 
to the voters, a provision that may not have been binding on the 
Convention.131 In any case, given the political climate surrounding the 
Convention, it is difficult to imagine the delegates not submitting the new 
constitution to the voters. The Constitution included Schedules providing for 
the submission of the proposed constitution to the voters on June 17, 1851, 
and, assuming its approval, establishing September 1, 1851, as the effective 
date of the new constitution.132 
The Schedule, however, contained a supermajority requirement, 
conditioning approval on a favorable vote of “a majority of all the votes, cast 
at such election.”133 The fact that the proposed constitution and the companion 
proposal on liquor were the only issues on the 1851 ballot effectively negated 
the supermajority requirement. The voters by a comfortable, though not 
overwhelming, majority approved the new constitution by a vote of 125,564 to 
109,276, excluding two counties that did not timely submit their returns.134 
E. Fear of Failure 
Of great concern to the delegates was the fear that controversial proposals 
could lead to the rejection of the entire constitution. This concern arose during 
the discussions of the judicial Article, but the controversial liquor issue was 
the greatest threat to the new constitution. The Convention was divided 
between those who wanted to bar completely the sale of liquor and those who 
wanted to license liquor and thus permit its sale.135 Cleverly, the Convention 
presented the liquor question as a separate, though confusing, issue to the 
                                                                                                                     
 128 OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3 (1851). 
 129 See id. 
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 131 McDonald, supra note 3, at 74. 
 132 See OHIO CONST. sched., § 9 (1851).  
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 134 See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 109.  
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voters, thus making it unlikely that this issue would lead to the rejection of the 
constitution.136  
VII. THE NEW TOOLS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THE SECOND 
HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The 1851 Constitution created new tools for future revisions of the Ohio 
Constitution, but these new tools did not make constitutional revision 
appreciably easier. 
A. Legislatively Proposed Amendments 
The biggest disappointment to those who believed that additional 
constitutional change was needed resulted from the application of the 
supermajority voting requirement to amendments proposed by the General 
Assembly.137 The requirement that a proposed amendment receive positive 
votes from a majority of those voting at an election (and not simply a majority 
of those voting on the particular issue) created an impediment to constitutional 
revision in elections that involved complex proposals, crowded ballots, or 
uninterested voters. Prior to 1912, proposed amendments and convention calls 
could only be presented to voters at general elections,138 and voter fatigue—as 
the political scientists now call it—contributed to the defeat of many popular 
proposals in the years following the adoption of the 1851 Constitution. 
For example, on October 13, 1857, a proposal for annual legislative 
sessions received 151,202 positive votes and 31,890 negative votes, but 
despite this almost 5-to-1 margin it failed because the positive 151,202 votes it 
received were less than 50% of the total vote of 332,126 at that election.139 
Likewise, on November 3, 1891, a proposal involving the taxation of real 
estate and tangible and intangible personal property received 303,177 positive 
votes and 65,014 negative votes, but despite this almost 5-to-1 margin it failed 
                                                                                                                     
 136 Under the separate-vote on the liquor issue, which was presented on a separate 
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because the 303,177 positive votes it received were less than 50% of the total 
vote of 803,328 at that election.140  
Indeed, between 1852 and 1911, the voters approved only eleven of the 
thirty-seven amendments proposed by the General Assembly.141 But of the 
twenty-six amendments that the voters defeated, nineteen received more 
positive than negative votes, but they failed under the supermajority 
requirement.142 The only significant exception to this pattern occurred during 
the brief period between 1903 and 1905, when state law permitted votes for 
party tickets to constitute positive votes on party-endorsed ballot issues.143 
During this period, the voters approved five of the eight proposed amendments 
by large margins, including a 1903 amendment that first gave the Ohio 
governor the veto power.144 
B. Constitutional Conventions 
Nor did Ohio have a positive experience with constitutional conventions 
during the last half of the nineteenth century. Pursuant to the mandatory call, 
the voters in 1871 approved a convention with a 72% favorable vote of those 
voting on the call,145 but in 1874 they rejected the proposed constitution by a 
similar overwhelming margin.146 The proposed constitution was long and 
detailed and appeared to have something to offend almost everyone; “[t]he 
convention itself was in session so long that people grew suspicious.”147 That 
might have been enough to doom it, but the supporters of a new constitution 
also had to contend with the baggage of controversial side issues.148 
As in 1850–1851 when the delegates had to deal with the liquor issue,149 
the 1873–1874 delegates were confronted with issues that they feared could 
jeopardize the constitution—propositions on minority party representation on 
the courts, on aid to the railroads, and on traffic in intoxicating liquors.150 By 
                                                                                                                     
 140 PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 271. 
 141 See Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 142 See STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 44.  
 143 Id. 
 144 See id.; see also Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 145 See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 170–71; see also Calls for Conventions, supra 
note 76. Of the 459,990 voters who voted for Representatives, 267,618 voted for the call, 
104,231 voted against the call, and 88,141 did not vote on the call. Id. Thus, 58.2% of the 
total votes at the election were in favor of the call, which easily met the supermajority 
requirement. 
 146 See infra note 152. 
 147 See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 26; see also id. at 26–27, 345–48 (detailing public 
suspicion and contemporary newspaper comments on the proposed Constitution of 1874). 
 148 See STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 39–41 (discussing the 1873–1874 
convention). 
 149 See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Proposed Constitution of 1874 sched., § 10, reprinted in PATTERSON, supra 
note 4, at 182, 232–34. 
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placing these propositions on the ballot separately, the delegates hoped that 
opposition to any of the controversial issues would not lead to the rejection of 
the new constitution. The Schedule, however, required that a separate 
proposition would only be adopted if the voters approved both it and the 
constitution,151 thus giving opponents of the three separate propositions a 
strong incentive to urge votes against the constitution. And the voters rejected 
the proposed constitution and the three side issues by substantial margins.152 
On November 3, 1891, the voters—perhaps chastened by the experience 
with the proposed 1874 Constitution—rejected the convention call by a vote of 
161,722 to 99,789 in an election in which 541,817 voters declined to cast a 
ballot on the convention call.153 Nonetheless, interest in a convention 
continued in the 1890s,154 and in 1896 the General Assembly voted to put a 
convention call on the ballot.155 The joint resolution placing the call on the 
ballot, however, contained details concerning the mode of voting, the printing 
of ballots, the length of the convention (no more than 90 days), and the 
compensation of delegates.156 Joint resolutions, which are not signed by 
governors, cannot supplant state statutes, so the Ohio Supreme Court 
concluded the joint resolution was void and ordered state officials not to put 
the convention call on the ballot.157 As a result, voters did not have an 
opportunity to vote on a proposed convention in the last decade of the 1800s. 
                                                                                                                     
 151 See id. sched., § 13. 
 152 Isaac Patterson summarized the results of the 1874 vote: 
The Constitution was submitted to the electors August 18, 1874. The total vote 
cast was 353,054, of which there were cast for the Constitution 102,885, and against it 
250,169. Three separate propositions were submitted with the following results: for 
minority representation, 73,615, and 259,415 against; for railroad aid, 45,416, and 
296,658 against; for licensing the liquor traffic 172,252, and 179,538 against. 
See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 176; see also STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 
41. 
 153 See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 269. The total vote cast at the 1891 election was 
803,328, so the convention call would have had to receive 401,665 votes to approve the 
convention call under the applicable supermajority voting requirement. See id. at 269–70; 
see also OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3 (1851) (establishing the supermajority requirement). 
 154 The proposed 1874 Constitution would have retained the provisions permitting the 
General Assembly to propose amendments and to put convention calls on the ballot, but it 
would have rejected the 20-year mandatory convention calls. See Proposed Constitution of 
1874 art. XVII, reprinted in PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 182, 228–29.  
 155 See S.J. Res. 14, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1896), 92 Ohio Laws 787. 
 156 Id.  
 157 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Kinney, 47 N.E. 569, 569 (Ohio 1897). But see 
State ex rel. Foreman v. Brown, 226 N.E.2d 116, 118 (Ohio 1967) (holding that “the 
General Assembly may authorize such special election on a certain date by a joint 
resolution without enacting a statute”). 
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VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN OHIO AT THE DAWN OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
State constitutional revision came to Ohio during the Progressive Era, 
when the nation had its third and final wave of state constitutional conventions 
and Ohio held its fourth constitutional convention, the Constitutional 
Convention of 1912. Between 1900 and 1920, thirteen states held 
constitutional conventions.158 And beginning with South Dakota in 1898 and 
ending with Massachusetts in 1918, sixteen states, primarily in the west and 
upper Midwest,159 embraced the constitutional initiative through their 
conventions or through other methods of constitutional revision. 
Support for the initiative and referendum had been building in Ohio during 
the first decade of the 1900s. In 1906 the Senate approved a proposed 
amendment for the initiative and referendum, but the House ignored it.160 Two 
years later the Senate and the House approved different versions of the 
initiative and referendum, but they were not able to or at least did not reconcile 
the differences.161 The state’s leading proponent of direct democracy, Herbert 
S. Bigelow, a minister at Cincinnati's Vine Street Congregational Church, a 
protégé of Cleveland’s legendary mayor Tom Johnson, and a strong backer of 
Henry George’s single-tax policies, saw this as political chicanery; he 
“declared that he would take the issue before the people at the next 
election.”162 
After another unsuccessful attempt to get the General Assembly to 
propose an initiative and referendum amendment in 1910, Bigelow and his 
allies turned their attention to the mandatory convention call that was 
scheduled to be on the ballot in 1911.163 Political pressure for a convention led 
the General Assembly to put the call on the ballot in 1910, one year ahead of 
schedule, and Ohio voters who voted on the convention call approved it by an 
overwhelming vote of greater than 10-to-1.164 That margin of support 
(notwithstanding those who did not vote on the call) was made possible not 
only by the broad array of interests that supported a convention but also by a 
state law that provided that straight party votes were counted as votes in favor 
                                                                                                                     
 158 DINAN, supra note 84, at 8–9. 
 159 See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the 
Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 11, 16 tbl.1 (1997) (discussing the regional origins of direct democracy). 
 160 HOYT LANDON WARNER, PROGRESSIVISM IN OHIO 1897–1917, at 181, 195–96, 204 
n.21 (1964). 
 161 Id. at 195–96. 
 162 Id. at 196. 
 163 Id. at 236, 295–96. 
 164 The vote was 693,263 to 67,718 with 171,281 not voting on the convention call. 
See Calls for Conventions, supra note 76.  
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of issues endorsed by the political parties; and the two leading parties had 
endorsed holding a convention.165 
Support for a constitutional convention was not limited to those whose 
primary focus was the initiative and the referendum. Diverse segments of the 
population, including many who viewed the current constitution as an obstacle 
for the proper governance of the state, lined up in favor of a convention.166 
There was, in the words of Hoyt Landon Warner, the foremost Ohio historian 
of this era, a “pent-up demand . . . for such reforms.”167 Warner identified 
support for a constitutional convention as coming from several groups: 
The Ohio State Board of Commerce, the precursor of the Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce, which wanted changes in the tax system.168 
The Direct Legislation League (a national Progressive organization with 
heavy Ohio involvement), which supported direct democracy—the 
constitutional initiative, the statutory initiative, and the referendum—as ways 
to get around the General Assembly and appeal directly to the people.169 
Labor, which wanted to remove the role of the constitution and the courts 
as obstacles to social welfare legislation.170 
The liquor interests, which wanted a loosening of restrictions on the sale 
of liquor.171 
Municipalities, which wanted home rule so that cities could manage their 
own affairs without having to repeatedly run to Columbus for special 
legislative enactments.172 
The Ohio Woman Suffrage Association, which wanted Ohio to become 
the first state east of the Mississippi to extend the vote to women.173 
The 1851 Constitution contained scant details about the operation of a 
convention other than specifying that the number of delegates would be the 
same as the number of members in the House of Representatives (which at the 
time was 119).174 In 1911, however, the General Assembly accepted the 
proposal of William Green, President of the Senate and future President of the 
American Federation of Labor, that the delegates be elected on a non-partisan 
                                                                                                                     
 165 See STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 47. 
 166 WARNER, supra note 160, at 295. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 WARNER, supra note 160, at 295. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Prior to the reapportionment revolution and the approval by the voters in 1967 of an 
amendment that established the size of the House of Representatives at ninety-nine, the 
number of representatives was based on a complex, fluctuating formula. See GOLD, supra 
note 87, at 423–25; see also OHIO CONST. art. XI § 2 (as amended in 1967). At the time of 
the 1912 Convention, there were 119 members in the House of Representatives. See Lloyd 
Sponholtz, The 1912 Constitutional Convention in Ohio: The Call-up and Nonpartisan 
Selection of Delegates, 79 OHIO HIST. 209, 212 (1970). 
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basis.175 This decision to circumvent the political parties, according to the 
Cleveland Federation of Labor, “gives workers the opportunity to unite on 
good men . . . who will guard the interest of the workers in making a new 
Constitution.”176 In addition to requiring a non-partisan ballot, the Act 
provided for the nomination of delegates only by petition.177  
Under the constitutionally based apportionment standards in effect at the 
time, every Ohio county had at least one state representative, and the larger 
counties had multiple representatives.178 The election of convention delegates 
was on a county-by-county basis, so the effort to organize county slates, 
especially in the larger multidelegate counties, was an important part of the 
effort to elect sympathetic delegates.179 
Though non-partisan, the election of delegates was vigorously contested 
with the Progressive forces led by the Progressive Constitutional League 
(PCL), a new organization founded by Herbert S. Bigelow.180 The PCL 
organized extensively, working with other organizations, especially advocates 
of home rule and the labor movement, to put forward slates of candidates 
pledged to the pro-direct democracy position.181 Their efforts were successful, 
as a majority of the delegates to the Convention had pledged their support for 
some version of direct democracy before the start of the convention.182 
IX. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1912 
Convened on January 8, 1912, in Columbus, the Constitutional 
Convention elected Herbert S. Bigelow president on the eleventh ballot.183  
                                                                                                                     
 175 See S.B. 15, 79th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 15 (Ohio 1911), 102 Ohio Laws 298, 
302; see also Michael Pierce, Organized Labor and the Law in Ohio, in 2 THE HISTORY OF 
OHIO LAW 883, 897 (Michael Les Benedict & John F. Winkler eds., 2004).  
 176 See Pierce, supra note 175, at 897 (alteration in original) (quoting Cleveland 
Federation of Labor, Labor Day Year Book and Souvenir Program of the Ohio State 
Federation of Labor 26 (1912)); see also id. at 896–99 (discussing the important role labor 
played in securing and supporting the convention).  
 177 Ohio S.B. 15 § 6, 102 Ohio Laws at 299 . The Act also permitted, but did not 
require, delegates to file a statement on whether they favored the separate submission to the 
voters of a question on the licensing of liquor. See id. § 11, 102 Ohio Laws at 301. 
 178 Amendment Giving Each County at Least One Representative, 1903, reprinted in 
PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 279 (amending OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 2 (1851)) (“[E]ach 
county shall have [at least] one representative.”). 
 179 See generally Sponholtz, supra note 174, at 213–14. 
 180 See id. at 213. Bigelow was a long-time supporter of the initiative and referendum, 
but Warner suggests that Bigelow and his allies were primarily interested in the single-tax 
and that they saw the initiative as a way to achieve that goal. See WARNER, supra note 160, 
at 195, 295–96, 307–08 & n.3. 
 181 See Sponholtz, supra note 174, at 213–14. 
 182 See Landon Warner, Ohio’s Constitutional Convention of 1912, 61 OHIO ST. 
ARCHEOLOGICAL & HIST. Q. 11, 17 (1952). 
 183 See WARNER, supra note 160, at 313–14. 
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The 1912 Ohio Convention was an important national event. Taking place 
in the midst of a pitched battle for the Republican presidential nomination, the 
convention was a magnet for prominent political figures. Those addressing the 
convention included the sitting President (and presidential candidate) William 
Howard Taft, former President (and insurgent Republican presidential 
candidate) Theodore Roosevelt (who gave a major address touting direct 
democracy, including his version of judicial recall), three-time presidential 
candidate (and future Secretary of State) William Jennings Bryan, California 
Governor Hiram Johnson, Ohio Governor Judson Harmon, and Cleveland 
Mayor (and future Secretary of War) Newton D. Baker.184  
The most hotly contested issue concerned the initiative and referendum 
with the delegates spending more time on this than on any other issue.185 The 
debates on these issues were long and emotional and included twelve roll call 
votes.186 The rhetoric was elevated. 
Stepping down from the chair, Bigelow exhibited the religious-like fervor 
with which he viewed the issue of direct democracy: 
Oh! my friends, we are striking down tyranny. We are forging the greatest 
tools democracy ever had. We are building grander institutions for freedom 
and for humanity than the world has ever known. We are engaged not only in 
an important civic work—our task is a profoundly religious one.187 
Not to be overshadowed, the opponents treated the initiative as a socialist 
plot designed to install the single tax and to soak those whose wealth came 
from real property. James Halfhill of Lima, made this argument: 
Obviously the money that foots the bills for this radical unlimited initiative 
comes from men looking beyond the present to the use they can make of this 
machine after it is created; and it is an open secret that the special end desired 
and expected is to put into effect in Ohio the single, or exclusive land tax. 
Rich men, whose property is personal, are joining hands with socialism to 
throw all the burdens of government upon the soil and take from private 
owners all title to their income from the land.188  
Despite the strong final vote in favor of the direct democracy proposal,189 
there had been sharp disagreements about the shape of direct democracy 
                                                                                                                     
 184 See id. at 318–19. 
 185 See id. at 319; see also Lloyd Luther Sponholtz, Progressivism in Microcosm: An 
Analysis of the Political Forces at Work in the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912, at 
148 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author) 
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 186 Sponholtz, supra note 185, at 148. 
 187 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE 
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 188 Id. at 696.  
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among its supporters. Ultimately, the delegates approved a compromise that 
rejected the use of a fixed number of required signatures without a 
geographical distribution requirement (in favor of a fixed statewide percentage 
with a geographic distribution requirement) and that rejected the direct (as 
contrasted to the indirect) statutory initiative.190 They also rejected a proposal 
to permit the initiation of constitutional conventions.191 And finally, they 
rejected an effort by opponents of the initiative to include a poison pill that 
would have removed the property tax exclusion from the statutory initiative.192 
The delegates to the 1912 Convention also paid close attention to Ohio’s 
experience with constitutional revision. They wisely decided not to risk a 
repeat of the 1874 debacle in which the voters, presented with an up-or-down 
vote on the entire proposed constitution (along with three controversial side 
issues), rejected both the proposed constitution and the side issues.193 Instead, 
the delegates avoided a winner-take-all gamble and submitted forty-two 
discrete proposals to the voters.194 
The delegates also strategically scheduled the vote for a special election on 
Tuesday, September 3, 1912, the day after Labor Day,195 in the expectation 
that organized labor, which supported all forty-two proposed amendments, 
would have an opportunity to encourage its members to vote.196  
Although turnout was light, the voters approved thirty-four of the forty-
two proposed amendments.197 This included not only the amendment 
                                                                                                                     
 190 See id. at 1901; see also WARNER, supra note 160, at 321–23; Robert Crosser, The 
Initiative and Referendum Amendments in the Proposed Ohio Constitution, XLIII ANNALS 
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Chairman of the Committee on The Initiative and Referendum). 
 191 See 2 1912 DEBATES, supra note 187, at 1368. 
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 194 Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 195 Warner, supra note 182, at 28. 
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amendments with the exception of the proposal to limit the use of the labor injunction. See 
Pierce, supra note 175, at 899. 
 197 See WARNER, supra note 160, at 341 (noting that “citizens had become absorbed in 
the Taft-Roosevelt-Wilson presidential campaign and were apathetic to the constitutional 
changes” and that “[t]he predicted light vote was realized”); Table of Proposed 
Amendments, supra note 139. The number of total votes on the proposal that received the 
most votes—woman’s suffrage—was 586,295, while the number of total number of votes 
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embracing direct democracy, but also amendments providing cities with home 
rule powers, overruling seven Ohio Supreme Court decisions, embracing the 
direct primary, authorizing the sale of liquor, and expanding employee 
rights.198 On the other hand, the voters rejected eight proposed amendments, 
including proposals to extend the vote to women, ban capital punishment, limit 
labor injunctions, issue bonds to raise funds for road and highway 
construction, and delete “white” from the voting qualifications.199  
Interestingly, the success of the convention at the polls would not have 
been possible had a supermajority requirement been applicable to amendments 
proposed by conventions. In fact, ten of the thirty-four amendments approved 
by the voters would have been rejected because they did not receive a majority 
of those who voted at the election.200 That would have led to the rejection of 
the most important amendment for changing the approval process for future 
constitutional amendments—the provision rejecting the use of a supermajority 
requirement for legislatively proposed amendments.201  
X. THE END OF THE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENT 
The 1912 Convention is best known for its adoption of the amendment 
that brought direct democracy to Ohio, but the cause of ad hoc constitutional 
revision also received a major boost from the rejection of the supermajority 
requirement. 
Delegates at the 1912 Convention were keenly aware that the 
supermajority requirement had made it practically impossible to obtain voter 
approval of amendments proposed by the General Assembly.202 Mr. Starbuck 
Smith of Hamilton County, Chairman of the Method of Amending the 
Constitution Committee, criticized the system in place since 1851, which 
                                                                                                                     
on the proposal that received the least votes—licensing in intoxicating liquors—was 
462,186. By way of comparison, in the 1910 and 1912 gubernatorial elections the total 
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187, at 2112–13. 
 198 See STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 49–53; see also Table of Proposed 
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 200 See Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. There were no items on the 
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margin, but given the 293,148 benchmark, see supra note 200, on the largest turnout issue 
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 202 See generally 2 1912 DEBATES, supra note 187, at 1365–68. 
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required a majority of all voters voting at the election.203 He noted that thirty 
of the forty-eight states provided that a majority voting on the amendment was 
sufficient, and that three states accomplished the same result by requiring that 
proposed amendments only be submitted to voters at separate elections.204 
Describing the proposal to rely on a favorable vote of a majority voting on 
the question as “the greatest fundamental change,”205 Mr. Smith encountered 
no serious opposition to his proposal to eliminate the supermajority 
requirement.206 And the delegates supported the proposal by a vote of 
105–1.207  
As a result of the removal of the supermajority requirement, the success 
rate of amendments proposed by the General Assembly improved 
dramatically.208 Prior to 1912, Ohio voters approved only eleven of thirty-
seven amendments proposed by the General Assembly,209 But since 1913, the 
voters approved 106 of the 154 amendments proposed by the General 
Assembly, a success rate that increased from 27% to 69%.210 
The 1912 Convention also proposed an amendment to the voting 
requirements on the constitutional call to eliminate the requirement that a 
majority of those voting at the election support the calling of a convention.211 
This supermajority provision (and a similar one in the 1802 Constitution)212 
applied to all pre-1932 votes on convention calls, including the 1911 vote.213 
The votes on convention calls, however, were never close, and thus this 
supermajority requirement did not have an impact on the results of such 
elections.214  
                                                                                                                     
 203 Id. at 1366. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
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XI. THE OHIO EXPERIENCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE 
A. The Ohio Constitutional Initiative 
Proposed by the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912 and approved by 
the voters by a vote of 312,592 to 231,312,215 the adoption of the initiative and 
referendum was the singular accomplishment of the Convention and the 
culmination of many years of organizing by its proponents.  
Under Ohio’s direct constitutional initiative, proponents of initiated 
amendments must collect valid signatures of 10% of the number of votes in 
the most recent gubernatorial election.216 To assuage concerns of rural 
interests about urban domination,217 there is a county-based geographic 
distribution requirement that 5% of the signatures coming from forty-four of 
Ohio’s eighty-eight counties.218 Proposed initiated amendments, unlike 
amendments proposed by the General Assembly219 or by a convention,220 may 
only be placed on the ballot in the fall general election.221 And, unlike 
virtually all other states,222 there is no time limit in Ohio by which these 
signatures must be obtained.223  
Fearful of meddling by the General Assembly, the delegates made the 
provisions of the initiative “self-executing.”224 But the delegates were also 
aware of the possible need to supplement the constitution provisions, and they 
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gave the General Assembly the power to enact legislation to facilitate, but not 
limit or restrict, the initiative.225 
Under the “facilitating” provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, the 
proponent of an initiated constitutional amendment must first submit a written 
petition to the Attorney General signed by 1,000 Ohio qualified electors.226 
The petition must include the full text of the proposed amendment as well as a 
summary of it.227 The Attorney General then reviews the submission and 
determines whether the summary is a “fair and truthful statement” of the 
proposed amendment.228 This review by the Attorney General, which must be 
completed within ten days of receipt of the petition,229 is nonsubstantive. 
Thus, it does not contemplate the Attorney General addressing either the 
wisdom of the proposed amendment or whether, if approved by the voters, it 
would be constitutional. 
Once a proposed amendment is certified, the Attorney General forwards 
the petition to the Ballot Board, which has ten days to determine whether the 
proposal contains only one constitutional amendment.230 If these hurdles are 
overcome, the petitioners may begin collecting the signatures of qualified 
electors.231 
Signatures collected are reviewed by the Secretary of State, who 
determines their validity, and the Ballot Board, a body created by 
constitutional amendment in 1974, is responsible for preparing the language 
for the ballot, including a summary of the proposed amendment.232 
B. The Ohio Experience 
Despite the heated and lengthy debates at the 1912 Convention, the 
constitutional initiative did not deliver what its proponents wanted or what its 
opponents feared. In the more than 100 years since adopting the initiative and 
referendum, Ohio voters have approved only eighteen of the sixty-nine 
                                                                                                                     
 225 Id. (“Laws may be passed to facilitate their operation but in no way limiting or 
restricting either such provisions or the powers herein reserved.”). 
 226 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.01(A) (West Supp. 2015). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id.; see also Schaller v. Rogers, 2008-Ohio-4464, at ¶¶ 13–16 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 
4, 2008) (describing the development of these facilitating provisions, beginning in 1929, 
and reviewing the evolution of the statutory provisions requiring those proposing a 
constitutional amendment to submit a petition to the Attorney General for a fair and 
truthful determination). 
 229 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.01(A). 
 230 See id. § 3505.062(A). 
 231 Id. § 3519.01(B)(1). 
 232 See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.062. After the 
submission of the requisite number of signatures, the Ballot Board makes a determination 
on compliance with the antimonopoly amendment. See infra notes 319—26 and 
accompanying text. 
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constitutional amendments proposed by initiatives,233 but during the same 
period, they approved 106 of the 154 constitutional amendments proposed by 
the General Assembly.234 
Table 1: Constitutional Revision in Ohio, 1913–2015235 
 Initiative-Petition General Assembly Total 
Approved 18 106 124 
Rejected 51 48 99 
Total 69 154 223 
Approval 
Percentage 26.1% 68.8% 55.6% 
 
There was an initial flurry of activity with voters approving four 
amendments proposed by initiative in the remaining years of the decade, but 
during that same seven-year period the voters rejected ten amendments 
proposed by initiative.236 
There was even less successful initiative activity in the 1920s with the 
voters rejecting all five of the proposed initiated constitutional amendments.237 
Indeed, in 1926, Newton D. Baker, an icon of the Progressive Movement, a 
close associate of Cleveland’s legendary Mayor Tom Johnson, a future Mayor 
of Cleveland, and Secretary of War under President Wilson, shared his 
disappointment with the tools of direct democracy.238 In a symposium in The 
Survey, a leading journal of the social work profession and social reform, the 
editors asked a group of prominent activists to address: Where Are the Pre-
War Radicals?239 Baker identified the success of the home rule movement, 
                                                                                                                     
 233 See Statistical Tables of Amendments, supra note 6; see also Ohio Constitution—
Law and History: Table of Initiated Constitutional Amendments Approved by Ohio Voters, 
CLEV.-MARSHALL L. LIBR., http://guides.law.csuohio.edu/c.php?g=190570&p=3200756 
[https://perma.cc/BB6X-623M] (last updated Mar. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Table of 
Proposed Initiated Amendments]. The courts rejected two of the eighteen voter-approved 
amendments that had been proposed by initiative. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 
(1920) (holding that an initiated amendment that permitted the referendum to be used to 
override the ratification of federal constitutional amendments by the General Assembly 
was inconsistent with Article V of the United States Constitution); State ex rel. Greenlund 
v. Fulton, 124 N.E. 172, 177 (Ohio 1919) (rejecting an initiated amendment on the 
classification of property for taxation because it received fewer affirmative votes than a 
conflicting legislatively proposed amendment). 
 234 Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See id. 
 237 See id. 
 238 See, Newton W. Baker, Where Are the Pre-War Radicals?, 8 SURVEY 556, 556 
(1926). 
 239 Id. 
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large issues concerning post-war Europe, and peace, but he also addressed the 
reform agenda of the Progressives, not necessarily focusing only on Ohio.240 
[W]e must admit that some of the things radicals contended for have been 
tried and found of less value in practice than they promised in theory. Among 
these are the initiative and referendum, the recall, the non-partisan primary, 
the commission form of government and proportional representation. That 
some of these have proved useful is clear, but their absolute importance is 
plainly less than was once supposed.241 
The experience that contributed to Baker’s disappointment continued well 
into the twentieth century. There was a slight increase of activity in the 1930s 
with three of five proposed initiated amendments being approved, but in the 
five decades from 1940 to 1990, the voters approved only three of twenty-two 
constitutional amendments proposed by initiative.242 Thus, from the adoption 
of the initiative in 1912 until 1990, the voters approved only ten of forty-nine 
initiated amendments, an approval rate of 20.4%.243 Since 1990, however, 
there has been an increase in the successful use of the constitutional initiative. 
In this period, the voters approved eight of twenty proposed initiated 
amendments,244 a 40% success rate, which may be explained in part by the 
number of politically popular issues on the ballot, including term limits, a ban 
on same-sex marriage, minimum wage, and freedom to choose healthcare (i.e., 
anti-Obamacare).245 Moreover, there has been a discernible (though not 
unprecedented) effort in recent years to place issues on the ballot that are 
likely to gin up voter turnout and benefit general election candidates.246 
Despite the recent increase in the successful use of the constitutional 
initiative, Ohio is in a peculiar position when compared to the other states that 
have the constitutional initiative. Of the eighteen states with the constitutional 
initiative, Ohio has the sixth highest number of proposed initiated 
amendments, behind only Arkansas, California, Colorado, Michigan, and 
                                                                                                                     
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 See id. 
 246 Id. The proposed amendments on term limits in 1992, on same-sex marriage in 
2004, and on the minimum wage in 2006 can all be seen in this light, but so can the 
depression-era initiated amendment to prohibit the application of the sales tax to food to be 
consumed off-premises, a proposal advanced to further the 1936 re-election effort of 
Governor Martin L. Davey. See Unsound Method, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 27, 1936, at 
8:2; see also Ralph J. Donaldson, Martin L. Davey 1935–1939, in OHIO HISTORICAL 
SOC’Y, THE GOVERNORS OF OHIO 179 (1954). 
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Oregon, but its approximately 25% rate of approval is the lowest of all 
eighteen states that have the constitutional initiative.247  
A full review of the history of the constitutional initiative, including a 
substantive review of the proposed amendments that the voters rejected, is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but there were important, but unsuccessful, 
efforts to use the constitutional initiative to alter the constitutional initiative 
itself. In 1915, a proposed “Stability Amendment” would have created a six-
year bar on using the initiative to propose an amendment that had been 
defeated twice.248 In 1939, Herbert S. Bigelow surfaced again and was the 
moving force behind a proposed amendment to substitute a fixed number of 
100,000 signatures gathered at large to place a constitutional amendment on 
the ballot, thus eliminating the percentage requirement for signatures as well 
as the geographic distribution requirement.249 And in 1976, a proposed 
amendment to “simplify” the initiative process would have also substituted a 
fixed number of 250,000 signatures and eliminated the geographic distribution 
requirement.250  
                                                                                                                     
 247 See Jennie Bowser, Chart on National Initiative Activity (2012) (unpublished) (on 
file with author). The average passage rate for states with the constitutional initiative is 
46.2%. See id. Since 1912, Ohio voters have only approved 26.1% of proposed initiated 
amendments, the lowest percentage of any of the eighteen states with the constitutional 
initiative. Id. 
 248 See John A. Lapp, Legislative Notes and Reviews: The Initiative and Referendum in 
1915, 10 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 320, 323–24 (1916). The proposed “Stability Amendment,” 
which was supported by the brewing industry and its apparent creation, the Constitutional 
Stability League, was aimed at the repeated efforts to place prohibition amendments on the 
ballot. Id.; see also ‘Stability’ May Mean Stagnation, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 15, 1915, 
at 8. But see Should Ohio’s Constitution Be a Political Football?, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, 
Oct. 28, 1915, at 15 (political advertisement supporting the proposed stability amendment); 
WARNER, supra note 160, at 437–38 n.13. 
 249 See Ohio Initiative and Referendum System, Amendment 3 (1939), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Initiative_and_Referendum_System,_Amendment_3_(1939) 
[https://perma.cc/U8V8-W8SD] (quoting amendment summary on the ballot). The Bigelow 
proposal would have also made significant changes in the statutory initiative. See id. A 
companion proposal also advanced by Bigelow would have required the state to provide 
old age pensions. The voters overwhelmingly rejected both proposed amendments by more 
than a 3-to-1 margin, see Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139, in an election in 
which Bigelow became the main issue. See, e.g., Foes of Bigelow Organized Here, CLEV. 
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 15, 1939, at 6-A. 
 250 See Ohio Initiative & Referendum Procedures, Amendment 7 (1976), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Initiative_%26_Referendum_Procedures,_ 
Amendment_7_(1976) [https://perma.cc/977A-KDLA] (quoting amendment summary on 
the ballot). 
The proponent of the 1976 amendment was Ohioans for Utility Reform, a consumer 
organization that sponsored four separate initiated amendments, including an amendment 
to change the initiative and three others addressing nuclear power plant safety and the 
residential utility rates. See Citizens League Says Vote No on Four Utility Reform Issues, 
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 17, 1976, at 10; “No” to Issues 4, 5, 6, 7, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, 
Oct. 21, 1976, at 34-A. In including initiative reform in its package, Ohioans for Utility 
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On the other hand, beginning in the 1970s the voters approved several 
constitutional changes proposed by the General Assembly in the procedures 
concerning the adoption of constitutional amendments. In 1971, the voters 
approved an amendment to eliminate the requirement that all proposed 
amendments be mailed to electors, requiring notice by publication for five 
weeks in newspapers of general circulation instead.251 In 1974, the voters 
approved an amendment, based on a 1973 recommendation from the Ohio 
Constitutional Revision Commission (OCRC), to create the Ballot Board and 
simplify the preparation of ballot language and information for voters about 
amendments proposed by the General Assembly.252 In 1975, the OCRC made 
a far-ranging proposal to change both the constitutional and statutory initiative 
(including the elimination of the geographic distribution requirement).253 The 
General Assembly, however, put a more modest proposal on the ballot, but not 
until 1978, when the voters approved it.254 The 1978 amendment reduced the 
required number of weekly publications to three, expanded the role of the 
Ballot Board to include amendments proposed by initiative and made the 
ballot-preparation procedures, which were applicable to General Assembly 
proposed amendments, also applicable to initiated amendments (arguably 
including the one amendment, separate-vote requirement).255 In 2008, the 
voters approved an amendment that made changes in the filing deadlines for 
initiated amendments and that gave the Ohio Supreme Court original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over all challenges to petitions and signatures.256 In 
2015, the voters also approved an antimonopoly amendment that placed 
obstacles in the way of proposed initiated amendments that would create 
                                                                                                                     
Reform relied on the recommendations of the OCRC, which in 1975 had recommended the 
use of a fixed 250,000 signature requirement and the elimination of the geographic 
distribution requirement. See OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMM’N, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE OHIO CONSTITUTION PART 9 (1975) 
[hereinafter OCRC PART 9], http://www.lsc.ohio.gov/ocrc/recommendations%20pt9 
%20initiative%20and%20referendum.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YH9-TU53]; see also OHIO 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE OHIO 
CONSTITUTION: FINAL REPORT 343–70 (1977) [hereinafter OCRC FINAL REPORT], 
http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/uploads/OCMC/OCRCFinalReport(summaryofhistory)(e
xcerpts)FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/P868-AH3L]. 
 251 See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g (as amended in 1971). 
 252 See id. art. XVI, § 1 (as amended in 1974); see also OCRC FINAL REPORT supra 
note 250, at 188–91 (1977). 
 253 See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 25, 343–70. The OCRC 
recommendation to eliminate the geographic distribution requirement was based, at least in 
part, on concerns about whether it was consistent with the “one man one vote 
requirement.” See id. at 368–69. 
 254 See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g (as amended in 1978); see also OCRC FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 250, at 368–69. 
 255 See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g (as amended in 1978); see also infra Part XII.C.1 text 
(discussing the one amendment, separate-vote requirement).  
 256 See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g (as amended in 2008).  
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monopolies, specify or determine tax rates, or provide special benefits not 
generally available to others.257 
C. Margins of Success and Voter Turnout  
The margins by which the voters approved initiated amendments have 
changed over the years. Five of the first six initiated amendments that the 
voters approved received less than a 60% favorable vote.258 But since 1935, 
thirteen of the sixteen approved constitutional initiatives received more than 
60% of the vote. The only approved constitutional initiatives receiving less 
than 60% of the vote since 1935 were the adoption of the office-type ballot in 
1949, the increase in the minimum wage in 2006, and casino gambling in 
2009.259 
Voter turnout, as measured by the number of voters who vote on proposed 
amendments, has been uneven with a slight trend of an increasing turnout. Of 
the first nine approved initiatives between 1914 and 1949, two had turnouts 
over 90%, two had turnouts over 80%, and three had turnouts in the 70% 
range.260 The two highest turnouts occurred in 1914 (home rule power over 
liquor) and 2009 (casino gambling), when 96.0% and 98.2% of the voters 
respectively voted on the proposed amendments.261 For the nine most recent 
successful initiated amendments from 1977 to 2011, the turnout was above 
93% in every election with the exception of the 1992 vote on term limits (for 
which the turnout was approximately 87%).262 
XII. LIMITATIONS ON THE DIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE 
A. Limitations on the Use of the Constitutional Initiative 
Sixteen states have direct constitutional initiatives and two have indirect 
constitutional initiatives.263 Most of these states do not place substantive 
limitations on the use of the constitutional initiative, but some do.264 The 
                                                                                                                     
 257 See Ohio Initiated Monopolies Amendment, Issue 2 (2015), BALLOTPEDIA, https:// 
ballotpedia.orgOhio_Initiated_Monopolies_Amendment,_Issue_2_(2015) [https://perma.cc/ 
G79L-WYVM]; see also infra Part XII.C.3. 
 258 See Table of Proposed Initiated Amendments, supra note 233. 
 259 See id. 
 260 See id.  
 261 See id. 
 262 See id.  
 263 See BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, Table 1.3, supra note 8, at 15. 
 264 See M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 18 (2003) (chart on 
limitations on the initiative). 
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courts, however, have rejected efforts to challenge substantive limitations on 
the initiative.265 
Illinois, though generally included in the list of sixteen states with direct 
constitutional initiatives, has a very limited constitutional initiative that may 
not be used to address subjects other than the structure and procedures of the 
legislature and which has been used successfully on only one occasion.266 
California prohibits initiated constitutional amendments “that name[] any 
individual to hold any office” or that require private corporations “to perform 
any function.”267 And Missouri prohibits the use of the initiative to appropriate 
existing revenues.268 
Massachusetts and Mississippi, both of which have indirect constitutional 
initiatives, remove a significant number of issues from their constitutional 
initiatives. In Massachusetts, the constitutional initiative may not be used for 
(a) measures that relate to religion, religious practices or religious institutions; 
(b) measures that relate to the appointment, qualification, tenure, removal, 
recall or compensation of judges, or to the reversal of judicial decisions; (c) 
measures that relate to the powers, creation or abolition of courts; (d) measures 
that make specific appropriations of state money; (e) measures that relate to 
the state’s ban on public funding of religious schools; (f) measures that relate 
to exclusions from the initiative process; or (g) propositions inconsistent with 
a broad range of individual rights.269 In Mississippi, the constitutional 
initiative may not be used (a) to propose, modify, or repeal any portion of the 
Bill of Rights; (b) to amend or repeal any law or any provision of the 
Constitution relating to the Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System; 
(c) to amend or repeal the constitutional guarantee that the right of any person 
to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or 
nonmembership in any labor union or organization; or (d) to modify the 
initiative process for proposing amendments to the state constitution.270 
                                                                                                                     
 265 See infra Part XII. B. But cf. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 
U.S. 182 (1999) (striking down state constitutional provisions concerning the initiative 
process on First Amendment grounds).  
 266 See ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (“Amendments shall be limited to structural and 
procedural subjects contained in [the Legislative Article].”); ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS 
CONSTITUTION 264–66 (2010) (describing state court decisions narrowly construing the 
Illinois constitutional initiative). 
 267 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12 (“No amendment to the Constitution, and no statute 
proposed to the electors by the Legislature or by initiative, that names any individual to 
hold any office, or names or identifies any private corporation to perform any function or 
to have any power or duty, may be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”). 
 268 MO. CONST. art. III, § 51 (prohibiting the use of initiatives “for the appropriation of 
money other than of new revenues created and provided for thereby”). 
 269 MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, § (II)2. 
 270 MISS. CONST. art. 15, §§ 273(5)(a)–(d). 
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B. Litigation 
The presence of substantive limitations on the use of the initiative has led 
many academic commentators to conclude that the limitations infringe upon 
the First Amendment,271 but the few courts that have addressed these issues 
have rejected federal constitutional challenges to these limitations.  
The leading case addressing the validity of subject-matter limitations on 
the use of constitutional initiatives is Wirzburger v. Galvin.272 The plaintiffs 
wanted to amend the Anti-Aid provision of the Massachusetts Constitution to 
allow public financial support for private, religiously affiliated schools, but the 
state constitution had prevented initiatives on this subject since the adoption of 
the religious exclusion as a result of the Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention of 1917–1918.273 The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that the state constitutional provisions prohibiting ballot initiatives 
on this subject constituted a restriction on speech subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.274 Nonetheless, the court rejected the challenge to this state limitation 
on the constitutional initiative.275 
The other principal case involving a limitation on the initiative involves a 
Utah limitation on the use of the statutory initiative. In 1998, Utah amended its 
constitution to require a two-thirds majority for future ballot initiative 
                                                                                                                     
 271 See, e.g., J. Michael Connolly, Loading the Dice in Direct Democracy: The 
Constitutionality of Content- and Viewpoint-Based Regulations of Ballot Initiatives, 64 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 129, 132 (2008) (arguing that “both content- and viewpoint-
based regulations of ballot initiatives should be held to implicate the First Amendment” but 
that “viewpoint-based regulations of ballot initiatives should require strict scrutiny, while 
content-based regulations of ballot initiatives should require intermediate scrutiny” 
(footnote omitted)); Russell Patrick Plato, Selective Entrenchment Against State 
Constitutional Change: Subject Matter Restrictions and the Threat of Differential 
Amendability, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1470, 1470 (2007) (arguing that “the current framework 
used to evaluate subject matter restrictions . . . provides insufficient protection against the 
serious harms such restrictions create”); John Gildersleeve, Note, Editing Direct 
Democracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of Ballot Initiatives Offend the First 
Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2007) (arguing “that subject matter 
restrictions burden expressive conduct composed of non-speech and speech elements” and 
proposing “that courts apply intermediate scrutiny to restrictions on the subject matter of 
initiatives, affirming those that insulate state constitutional rights but invalidating those that 
simply calcify the electoral gains of transient political majorities”); Anna Skiba-Crafts, 
Note, Conditions on Taking the Initiative: The First Amendment Implications of Subject 
Matter Restrictions on Ballot Initiatives, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1315 (2009) (arguing 
that subject matter restrictions on ballot initiatives constrain “core political speech” and so 
should receive strict First Amendment scrutiny). 
 272 Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150 
(2006). 
 273 See id. at 280–81 (discussing the origin of the Religious Exclusion and its alleged 
anti-Catholic bias). 
 274 Id. at 271. 
 275 Id. 
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involving the taking of wildlife.276 This supermajority requirement was 
designed to protect Utah’s wildlife practices from proposals from animal and 
wildlife protection groups. This subject-specific supermajority requirement on 
the use of the statutory initiative was challenged as a violation of the First 
Amendment, but in Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker,277 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held “that a constitutional 
provision imposing a supermajority requirement for enactment of initiatives on 
specific topics does not implicate the freedom of speech.”278  
C. Limitations on the Ohio Constitutional Initiative 
Unlike the Ohio indirect statutory initiative, which has always had an 
explicit substantive limitation barring its use in certain tax matters,279 the Ohio 
direct constitutional initiative, when adopted, did not contain any textual or 
substantive limitations on its use.280 But there are three possible limitations on 
the use of the constitutional initiative in Ohio: (a) the one amendment, 
separate-vote requirement, (b) the exclusion of constitutional revisions from 
the initiative, and (c) the recently adopted antimonopoly amendment. 
1. One Amendment, Separate-Vote Requirement 
The 1851 Constitution included a one amendment, separate-vote 
requirement under which constitutional amendments proposed by the General 
Assembly (as contrasted to those proposed by constitutional conventions) had 
to be submitted to the voters in such a way as to permit a vote “on each 
amendment, separately.”281 This one amendment, separate-vote requirement 
was not included in the language adopting the constitutional initiative in 1912, 
                                                                                                                     
 276 UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(ii). 
 277 Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 1245 (2007). 
 278 Id. at 1085. 
 279 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e (1912) (“The powers defined herein as the ‘initiative’ and 
‘referendum’ shall not be used to pass a law authorizing any classification of property for 
the purpose of levying different rates of taxation thereon or of authorizing the levy of any 
single tax on land or land values or land sites at a higher rate or by a different rule than is 
or may be applied to improvements thereon or to personal property.”). This provision was 
adopted to foreclose the use of the statutory initiative to enact a tax plan based on the 
single-tax theories of Henry George. See WARNER, supra note 160, at 321–22 (discussing 
the political maneuvering around this limitation on the statutory initiative). 
 280 At the 1912 Constitutional Convention, the delegates rejected a proposal to bar the 
use of the constitutional initiative to adopt constitutional provisions that authorized the tax 
policies that could not be adopted through the statutory initiative. See 2 1912 DEBATES, 
supra note 187, at 1897–98. 
 281 OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1851) (“When more than one amendment shall be 
submitted at the same time, they shall be so submitted, as to enable the electors to vote on 
each amendment, separately.”).  
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but in 1978 the voters amended the constitution to provide that ballot 
language, including the presentation of amendments to be voted upon 
separately, was “subject to the same terms and conditions, as apply to issues 
submitted by the general assembly pursuant to Section 1 of Article XVI of this 
constitution.”282  
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. 
Brunner,283 described the purpose of the separate-vote requirement: 
The constitutional mandate that multifarious amendments shall be submitted 
separately has two great objectives. The first is to prevent imposition upon or 
deceit of the public by the presentation of a proposal which is misleading or 
the effect of which is concealed or not readily understandable. The second is 
to afford the voters freedom of choice and prevent “logrolling” or the 
combining of unrelated proposals in order to secure approval by appealing to 
different groups which will support the entire proposal in order to secure 
some part of it although perhaps disapproving of other parts.284 
The court has not decided whether the 1978 amendment extended the one 
amendment, separate-vote requirement to initiated amendments, but in Ohio 
Liberty Council, the court held that state law “imposes a similar requirement 
on citizen-initiated proposed constitutional amendments.”285 The court then 
equated the constitutional and statutory requirements, stating that “[b]ecause 
this [statutory] separate-petition requirement is comparable to the separate-
vote requirement for legislatively initiated constitutional amendments under 
Section 1, Article XVI of the Ohio Constitution, our precedent construing the 
constitutional provision is instructive in construing the statutory 
requirement.”286 The court then held that the Ballot Board had acted 
inappropriately in dividing a proposed amendment concerning healthcare into 
two separate amendments.287 In so ruling, the court implicitly—but not 
explicitly—concluded that the constitutional provision giving the General 
Assembly the power to adopt laws facilitating the operation of the initiative 
justified the application of the one amendment, separate-vote requirement to 
initiated amendments.288 
                                                                                                                     
 282 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g (as amended in 1978) (“The ballot language shall be 
prescribed by the Ohio ballot board in the same manner, and subject to the same terms and 
conditions, as apply to issues submitted by the general assembly pursuant to Section 1 of 
Article XVI of this constitution.”). 
 283 State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 928 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 2010) (per 
curiam). 
 284 Id. at 418 (quoting State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 28 (Ohio 2005)). 
 285 Id. at 415–16 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 3519.01(A)).  
 286 Id. at 416. 
 287 Id. at 416–17. 
 288 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1g (“Laws may be passed to facilitate [the] operation [of the 
initiative] but in no way limiting or restricting either such provision or the powers herein 
reserved.”). 
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In ruling that the one amendment, separate-vote requirement applied to 
both legislatively proposed and initiated amendments, the Ohio Liberty 
Council court defined the requirement as follows: 
[T]he applicable test for determining compliance with the separate-vote 
requirement of Section 1, Article XVI, is that “a proposal consists of one 
amendment to the Constitution only so long as each of its subjects bears some 
reasonable relationship to a single general object or purpose.” “Thus, where 
an amendment to the Constitution relates to a single purpose or object and all 
else contained therein is incidental and reasonably necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the amendment, such amendment is not violative of the provisions 
of Section 1, Article XVI.” Courts have generally taken a “liberal [view] in 
interpreting what such a single general purpose or object may be.”289 
Under this test, proposed amendments need not relate to a single subject 
but must only relate to a “single general object or purpose.”290 Thus, the 
standard is more forgiving than the “one-subject” requirement291 that limits 
the ability of the General Assembly to put unrelated subjects in a single 
statute.292  
Nonetheless, the implication of the one amendment, separate-vote 
requirement is that it may limit the power of the General Assembly and the 
people (through the initiative) to make significant changes in the state 
constitution. More than 175 years ago, Caleb Atwater suggested an article-by-
article revision of the Ohio Constitution.293 At the time, the only vehicle for 
constitutional revision was the convention, but we now have additional tools. 
It is unclear, however, whether the new tools are suited for the type of 
constitutional revision that Atwater sought. What is clear is that any effort to 
push the boundaries to propose broad reform, including article-by-article 
                                                                                                                     
 289 Ohio Liberty Council, 928 N.E.2d at 416 (alterations in original) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown, 282 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1972)); State ex 
rel. Burton v. Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp., 218 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 1966); State ex rel. 
Foreman v. Brown, 226 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1967)). 
 290 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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Ass’n. v. State, No. 2014-0319, 2016 WL 541263 (Ohio Feb. 11, 2016) (“The one-subject 
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bill embraces more than one topic is not fatal as long as a common purpose or relationship 
exists between the topics.” (citation omitted)). 
 292 See State ex rel. Foreman v. Brown, 226 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio 1967) (“[A]t the 
same time that the [1850–1851] Constitutional Convention proposed Section 1 of Article 
XVI, it proposed [the one-subject rule] . . . . It is quite obvious therefore that, if those who 
submitted Section 1 of Article XVI had intended that each amendment to the Constitution 
proposed by the General Assembly be confined to one subject, object or purpose, they 
would have so provided as they did in Section 16 of Article II [Section 15(D), Article II]. 
They did not.”).  
 293 See ATWATER, supra note 79, at 175–77. 
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reform, will be tested by the courts, which will be asked whether “each of its 
subjects bears some reasonable relationship to a single general object or 
purpose.”294 
2. Constitutional Revisions vs. Constitutional Amendments 
There is a distinction in state constitutional law between constitutional 
amendments and constitutional revisions, and courts have used this distinction 
to limit the use of the initiative to amendments and to bar its use for 
constitutional revisions.295  
Although this distinction has not been the subject of litigation in Ohio, 
there is a textual basis for it. The words “revise” or “revision” are not in the 
1802 Constitution, which only permitted the General Assembly to recommend 
the calling of a convention “to amend or change this constitution.”296 
Nonetheless, the delegates to the 1850–1851 Convention did not doubt that 
they had authority to replace the existing constitution, and that is precisely 
what they proposed. And they codified this exercise of power by proposing a 
provision that permitted future General Assemblies to place on the ballot 
proposals “to call a convention, to revise, amend, or change this 
constitution.”297 The 1851 Constitution also used the word “revise” in the 
mandatory twenty-year votes on constitutional call, defining the question to be 
presented to the voters as: “Shall there be a convention to revise, alter, or 
amend the constitution”?298 Thus, the two new provisions relating to 
conventions included, for the first time, express references to “revise.” At the 
same time, the 1851 Constitution adopted a new provision giving the General 
Assembly the power to “propose amendments to this constitution.”299 
Arguably, this power did not extend to permitting the General Assembly to 
propose amendments that have the effect of revising the constitution. Finally, 
the language creating the direct constitutional initiative in 1912 simply 
permitted the people to propose amendments to the constitution without any 
reference to “revise” or “revisions.”300 
This distinction between constitutional amendments and constitutional 
revisions is reflected in the text of many state constitutions,301 and it precedes 
the first adoption of the constitutional initiative in South Dakota in 1898. 
                                                                                                                     
 294 Ohio Liberty Council, 928 N.E.2d at 416 (emphasis omitted).  
 295 See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 179–80 (2009). 
 296 OHIO CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1802). 
 297 OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (1851) (emphasis added). 
 298 Id. art. XVI, § 3. 
 299 Id. art. XVI, § 1. 
 300 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 (1912). 
 301 One commentator has noted that thirteen of the eighteen states that permit initiated 
constitutional amendments distinguish constitutional amendments from constitutional 
revisions and appear to bar the use of the initiatives to revise constitutions. See HENRY S. 
NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 386 (2014). 
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Although the distinction may at first seem only semantic, courts have used it to 
limit not only the use of the constitutional initiative but also the power of the 
state legislature to proposed wide-ranging changes in state constitutions. 
The origin of this distinction is the 1894 California Supreme Court 
decision in Livermore v. Waite,302 a pre-initiative case involving a dispute 
concerning the location of the seat of the state government. In the course of 
addressing the power of the legislature, the court stated: 
Article 18 of the constitution provides two methods by which changes 
may be effected in that instrument—one by a convention of delegates chosen 
by the people for the express purpose of revising the entire instrument, and 
the other through the adoption by the people of propositions for specific 
amendments that have been previously submitted to it by two-thirds of the 
members of each branch of the legislature. It can be neither revised nor 
amended, except in the manner prescribed by itself, and the power which it 
has conferred upon the legislature . . . .303 
In 1948, in McFadden v. Jordan,304 the California Supreme Court applied 
the revision-amendment distinction to a dispute involving the initiative. A 
proposed initiated amendment advanced by what was popularly referred to as 
the “ham and eggs” movement305 sought massive changes in the California 
Constitution. Relying on the revision–amendment distinction, the court held 
that the proposal could not be submitted to the voters because the measure was 
a constitutional revision not a constitutional amendment.306 
The California courts have continued to apply this distinction to limit the 
use of the constitutional initiative,307 and other state courts have embraced the 
                                                                                                                     
 302 Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 425 (Cal. 1894). 
 303 Id. at 425–26. 
 304 McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 788 (Cal. 1948). 
 305 See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1091 (Cal. 1990) (discussing 
background of the proposal at issue in McFadden and the subsequent adoption of a single-
subject limitation on the constitutional initiative). 
 306 The McFadden court noted that the proposed amendment consisted of an Article 
containing 12 separate sections divided into 208 subsections and containing more than 
21,000 words. See McFadden, 196 P.2d at 790. At the time this issue arose, California did 
not have a single-subject rule for initiatives, but the proposal led to California’s adoption of 
such a requirement. See MILLER, supra note 295, at 179 n.105. 
 307 See, e.g., Raven, 801 P.2d at 1078 (holding that an initiated constitutional provision 
restricting the independent judicial interpretation of enumerated state constitutional rights 
arising in criminal cases is a revision that cannot be accomplished through the initiative); 
cf. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60, 62 (Cal. 2009) (recognizing the distinction between 
amendments and revisions but concluding that an initiated amendment barring same-sex 
marriage was a permissible amendment and not a prohibited revision); Legislature of the 
State v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1309 (Cal. 1991) (recognizing the distinction between 
amendments and revisions but concluding that the initiated adoption of a budgetary 
limitations and legislative term limits did not constitute a proscribed constitutional 
revision), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 919 (1992). 
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distinction to limit the use of the initiative308 and to place limits on the ability 
of legislatures to propose constitutional amendments.309 In distinguishing 
revisions from amendments, the courts have considered “the effect—both 
quantitative and qualitative—that the constitutional change will have on the 
basic governmental plan or framework embodied in the preexisting provisions 
of the California Constitution.”310 
Despite the textual support for distinguishing between constitutional 
amendments and constitutional revisions, there is no evidence that this 
distinction has ever been used in Ohio to attempt to limit the power of either 
the General Assembly or the initiative. Nonetheless, it is possible that the Ohio 
courts will, at some point, be asked whether the General Assembly or the 
initiative may propose a major constitutional revision—or even a new 
constitution—to the voters.311 For example, will the courts be asked whether 
the General Assembly or the initiative could be used to propose the 
replacement of specific articles of the Ohio Constitution? If the General 
Assembly is constrained by the revision-amendment distinction, this constraint 
would surely apply to constitutional changes by proposed initiatives. But if the 
distinction is not applicable to amendments proposed by the General 
Assembly, there is an additional and unaddressed issue—at least in Ohio—as 
to whether the distinction in any way limits the use of the initiative. 
                                                                                                                     
 308 See, e.g., Holmes v. Appling, 392 P.2d 636, 639 (Or. 1964) (accepting the 
distinction between an amendment and a revision of the constitution, and holding that a 
proposed thorough overhaul of the constitution was either a revision of the constitution or a 
new constitution either of which could not be submitted to the voters through the 
initiative); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 832 (Fla. 1970) (holding that a proposed 
initiated amendment to create a unicameral legislature was not an authorized use of the 
initiative because it affected numerous sections of the constitution); Citizens Protecting 
Mich.’s Constitution v. Sec’y of State, 761 N.W.2d 210, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (per 
curiam) (relying on California cases and holding that initiative that sought to alter multiple 
articles of the Michigan Constitution and fundamentally redesign the framework of the 
Michigan Constitution was a constitutional revision, not an amendment, and could not be 
achieved through the initiative), aff’d without opinion, 755 N.W.2d 157 (Mich. 2008). 
 309 See, e.g., Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1999) (recognizing that “[t]he 
Framers of the Alaska Constitution distinguished between a revision and an amendment” 
and holding that a ballot proposition to limit the rights of prisoners to those afforded by the 
federal Constitution was a “revision” that could not be adopted by a legislative proposal); 
cf. Op. of the Justices, 264 A.2d 342, 342 (Del. 1970) (holding that a legislative proposal to 
amend the constitution but to make no substantial or fundamental change in state 
government, and to provide a mere reorganization, restatement, modernization, 
abbreviation, consolidation, simplification, or clarification of existing document, can be 
accomplished by legislative amendment without a constitutional convention). 
 310 Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61, abrogated on other grounds, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015); accord Martinez v. Kulongoski, 185 P.3d 498, 502–03 (Or. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 311 Litigation in Ohio involving the amendment-revision distinction will raise 
questions about whether the Ohio Supreme Court can provide pre-election or post-election 
judicial review, or both. There is no direct guidance in Ohio, but courts will be able to look 
to cases involving the one amendment, separate-vote requirement. See supra Part XII.C.1. 
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3. Antimonopoly Amendment 
On November 3, 2015, Ohio voters approved an amendment proposed by 
the General Assembly to make more difficult the use of the initiative to create 
monopolies, to specify or determine tax rates, or to confer special benefits on 
favored groups.312 This proposal was widely seen as a ploy to undercut a 
proposed initiated amendment to permit the growth, cultivation, manufacture, 
distribution, and sale of marijuana products for both recreational and medical 
uses.313 The marijuana proposal, described by its proponents as an investor-
driven initiative, would have given commercial growing licenses to ten groups 
of campaign investors.314 Many of its opponents characterized it as an effort to 
                                                                                                                     
 312 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)–(C). 
 313 In addition to framing the issues for the public debate, the antimonopoly 
amendment would have trumped the marijuana legalization amendment had the voters 
approved both of them. See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)(3):  
If, at the general election held on November 3, 2015, the electors approve a 
proposed constitutional amendment that conflicts with division (B)(1) of this section 
with regard to the creation of a monopoly, oligopoly, or cartel for the sale, 
distribution, or other use of any federal Schedule I controlled substance, then 
notwithstanding any severability provision to the contrary, that entire proposed 
constitutional amendment shall not take effect. 
If the antimonopoly amendment (with its antiseverability provision) received more 
affirmative votes than the marijuana legalization amendment, the antimonopoly 
amendment would have blocked the entire marijuana legalization amendment from taking 
effect. On the other hand, had the marijuana legalization amendment received more 
affirmative votes than the antimonopoly amendment, the breadth of the latter, if taken 
literally, would have also prevented the marijuana legalization amendment from taking 
effect. Such a result, however, seems inconsistent with the provision of the Ohio 
Constitution that addresses what happens when the voters approve conflicting 
amendments. See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b (“If conflicting . . . proposed amendments to 
the constitution shall be approved at the same election by a majority of total number of 
votes cast for and against the same, the one receiving the highest number of affirmative 
votes . . . shall be the amendment to the constitution.”); see also State ex rel. Greenlund v. 
Fulton, 124 N.E. 172, 174 (1919) (holding that in the event of conflicts the amendment 
with the most affirmative votes prevails). But see Press Release, Statement from Ohio 
Secretary of State Jon Husted (June 19, 2015), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/mediaCenter/ 
2015/2015-05-19.aspx [https://perma.cc/7W8F-X7ZK] (stating that legislatively proposed 
amendments, which become effective immediately, prevail in any conflict with initiated 
amendments, which do not take effect for thirty days after approval, regardless of which 
receives the most affirmative votes). 
 314 Anne Saker, What You Need to Know About Marijuana Initiative, CIN. ENQUIRER 
(July 24, 2015), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2015/06/17/marijuana-ohio-ballot 
initiative-responsibleohio/28897081/ [https://perma.cc/XY5R-Z4LD]; Ohio Marijuana 
Legalization Initiative, Issue 3 (2015), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_ 
Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Issue_3_(2015)#cite_note-text-1 [https://perma.cc/Y5DM-
RANJ]. 
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embed a monopoly into the Constitution, and the ballot explanation by the 
Ballot Board so characterized the proposal.315  
The voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposed marijuana legalization 
amendment but narrowly approved the antimonopoly amendment.316 As a 
result, the Ohio Constitution now contains its only substantive limitation on 
the use of the constitutional initiative. But it is not an absolute bar to the 
initiation of the amendments that it targets, though it makes their approval by 
the voters less likely. 
The antimonopoly provision identifies three categories of initiatives that it 
seeks to keep off the ballot: (a) amendments that “would grant or create a 
monopoly, oligopoly, or cartel”; (b) amendments that would “specify or 
determine a tax rate”; and (c) amendments that would “confer a commercial 
interest, commercial right, or commercial license . . . that is not then available 
to other similarly situated persons or nonpublic entities.”317 
Although the antimonopoly amendment seeks to bar the use of the 
initiative to adopt the disfavored amendments, the amendment is not an 
absolute bar to initiated amendments that are inconsistent with its 
provisions.318 Under the complex procedures in this provision, the Ballot 
Board is charged with determining whether a proposed amendment conflicts 
with the new standards.319 Even if there is a conflict, the proposed amendment 
may still appear on the ballot, but it will be the second of two separate 
questions.320 The first question will ask the voters:  
Shall the petitioner, in violation of division (B)(1) of Section 1e of Article II 
of the Ohio Constitution, be authorized to initiate a constitutional amendment 
that grants or creates a monopoly, oligopoly, or cartel, specifies or determines 
                                                                                                                     
 315 The heading of the ballot stated: “Anti-monopoly amendment; protects the 
initiative process from being used for personal economic benefit.” OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
OHIO BALLOT BOARD, ISSUE 2 (2015) [hereinafter OHIO BALLOT BOARD], 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2015/2-Language.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PE5B-2U2K]; see also State ex rel. ResponsibleOhio v. Ohio Ballot Bd., No. 2015-1411, 
2015 Ohio LEXIS 2391, at *5–6 (Sept. 16, 2015) (upholding the title of the antimonopoly 
amendment). 
 316 Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 317 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)(1). The full text of this limitation is as follows: 
[T]he power of the initiative shall not be used to pass an amendment to this 
constitution that would grant or create a monopoly, oligopoly, or cartel, specify or 
determine a tax rate, or confer a commercial interest, commercial right, or commercial 
license to any person, nonpublic entity, or group of persons or nonpublic entities, or 
any combination thereof, however organized, that is not then available to other 
similarly situated persons or nonpublic entities. 
Id. 
 318 See id. § 1e(B)(2). 
 319 See id. 
 320 Id. § 1e(B)(2)(b). 
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a tax rate, or confers a commercial interest, commercial right, or commercial 
license that is not available to other similarly situated persons?321  
The second question will describe the proposed constitutional amendment.322 
If the voters respond affirmatively to both questions, the proposed amendment 
will be approved.323 Thus, unlike limitations used in other states,324 this 
limitation creates an obstacle, indeed a high obstacle, so that voters may only 
approve an otherwise prohibited initiated amendment if they respond 
affirmatively to the question of whether they want to violate the limitation. 
This new constitutional provision contains a number of procedural and 
substantive issues. The provision does not clearly state whether the Ballot 
Board must make the “monopoly/tax rate/special benefit” determination early 
in the process when it is addressing the one amendment, separate-vote 
requirement or late in the process after signatures have been submitted and the 
Board is determining what will go on the ballot.325 However, in its first review 
of a proposed amendment after the adoption of the new procedure the Chair of 
the Ballot Board stated that the determination will be made at the end of the 
process.326 And, like other determinations of the Ballot Board concerning the 
ballot, the Ohio Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over 
such issues.327 
Substantively, it is unclear precisely what is barred. The provision does 
not define “monopoly, oligopoly, or cartel,” but courts should be able to figure 
                                                                                                                     
 321 Id. § 1e(B)(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
 322 Id. § 1e(B)(2)(b). 
 323 Id. § 1e(B)(2)(c).  
 324 See supra notes 266–70 and accompanying text. 
 325 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)(2). 
 326 See Transcript, Meeting of the Ohio Ballot Board 3–4 (Nov. 10, 2015) (“[T]hat 
determination falls on the Ballot Board not at the initial submission of the issue, but after a 
proposed statewide issue has met all of the requirements to be certified to the ballot, 
including certification of a single proposed amendment or law and collecting the required 
number of signatures from qualified voters.”); accord What Is a Citizen-Initiated 
Constitutional Amendment?, OHIO SECRETARY ST., https://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/ 
LegnAndBallotIssues/issues/initiatedamendment.aspx [https://perma.cc/V6VK-CTSW]. 
 327 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(C) (“The supreme court of Ohio shall have original, 
exclusive jurisdiction in any action that relates to this section.”). Notwithstanding this 
provision, opponents of the amendment, relying on the language providing that the 
antimonopoly determination was to be based on the “opinion of the Ohio ballot board,” 
argued that judicial review was not available. See, e.g., MAURICE A. THOMPSON, 1851 CTR. 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING STATE ISSUE 2: 
REASONS TO BE SKEPTICAL OF AMENDING THE OHIO CONSTITUTION 3 (Oct. 28, 2015), 
http://www.ohioconstitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Issue-2-Policy-Brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2KTT-3ZWW]. Proponents, on the other hand, might have pointed to the 
language defining a role for the state supreme court and to the general presumption against 
implied limitations on judicial review; cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) 
(requiring a clear statement by Congress when it eliminates judicial review of the 
constitutionality of an administrative action).  
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out their meaning. The limitation on initiatives that “specify or determine a tax 
rate” seems to be unmodified, but the official explanation issued by the Ballot 
Board described this prohibition as barring the use of the initiative to 
“establish a preferential tax status,”328 presumably based on the limiting 
language in the final clause of the provision. But it is unclear whether a strict 
application of the “last-antecedent” rule of construction329 only limits the 
“similarly situated” language to the final provisions concerning special 
benefits or whether it also relates back to the tax provision.330 What is clear, 
however, is that proposed initiated amendments that seek to confer special 
benefits to favored groups (or that seek to establish tax rates) will have to go 
through a difficult process and will undoubtedly be the subject of litigation. 
D. Judicial Review of Limitations on the Use of the Initiative 
The existence of limitations on the use of constitutional initiatives 
provides opponents of proposed amendments with a basis for seeking to keep 
proposals off the ballot, and courts around the country have provided both pre-
election and post-election judicial review of initiated amendments.331  
The Ohio Supreme Court has a broad constitutional grant of “exclusive, 
original jurisdiction in all cases challenging the adoption or submission of a 
proposed constitutional amendment to the electors.”332 A companion 
provision, adopted in 2008, provides the court with “exclusive, original 
                                                                                                                     
 328 See OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 6 (2015), 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/ballotboard/2015/2015IssuesReport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9XCW-UR4F] (including sample ballot and ballot explanations). 
 329 In Wohl v. Swinney, 888 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (2008), an insurance contract case, the 
Ohio Supreme Court discussed the last antecedent rule. 
“[R]eferential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, 
refer solely to the last antecedent . . . .” However, in relying on the last-antecedent 
rule, appellees overlook the fact that the rule applies only when no contrary intention 
otherwise appears. Thus, if there is contrary evidence that demonstrates that a 
qualifying phrase was intended to apply to more than the term immediately preceding 
it, we will not apply the last-antecedent rule so as to contravene that intent. Before 
applying the last-antecedent rule, we must therefore examine the contract as a whole 
to determine whether any contrary intent appears. 
Id. at 1065 (alteration in original) (quoting Indep. Ins. Agents of Ohio v. Fabe, 587 N.E.2d 
814 (Ohio 1992); cf. Lockhart v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 958, 962–63 (2016) (treating the “rule of 
the last antecedent” as a canon of statutory interpretation under which a limiting clause or 
phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately 
follows, but noting that the rule can be overcome by other indicia of meaning). 
 330 OHIO BALLOT BOARD, supra note 315.  
 331 See MILLER, supra note 295, at 101–24. See generally James D. Gordon III & 
David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 298 (1989) (arguing courts should not adjudicate pre-election challenges to 
a measure’s substantive validity).  
 332 OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1974). 
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jurisdiction over all challenges made to petitions and signatures upon such 
petitions under [the initiative and referendum].”333 Taken together, these 
provisions require that certain challenges always be brought before the 
election. Moreover, the court has held that Ohio courts may not provide 
substantive judicial review of the constitutionality of proposed amendments 
before elections,334 and state courts around the country generally also take this 
position.335  
The court, however, has provided pre-election judicial review in cases 
alleging non-compliance with the one amendment, separate-vote requirement. 
Indeed, in 1972 in State ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown,336 the court struck from the 
ballot the initial proposal from the Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission 
for violating the one amendment, separate-vote requirement.337 Roahrig 
involved amendments proposed by the General Assembly (at the behest of the 
OCRC) not by the initiative,338 but in State ex rel. Liberty Council v. 
Brunner,339 the court reviewed the decision of the Ballot Board to divide an 
initiated amendment on healthcare into two separate amendments. Therefore, 
it is clear that the court will also provide pre-election judicial review of 
putative violations of the one amendment, separate-vote requirement in cases 
involving proposed initiated amendments. 
                                                                                                                     
 333 Id. art. II, § 1g. In effect, this is mandatory pre-election review. Cases challenging 
“the petitions and signatures” must be filed no later than at least ninety-five days prior to 
the election, and amendments that are approved by the voters may not be struck down “on 
account of the insufficiency of the petitions.” Id. Furthermore, cases “challenging the ballot 
language, the explanation, or the actions or procedures of the General Assembly in 
adopting and submitting a constitutional amendment” must be filed no later than sixty-five 
days before the election. OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1974). 
 334 See State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 (Ohio 1983) (per 
curiam) (“It is well-settled that this court will not consider, in an action to strike an issue 
from the ballot, a claim that the proposed amendment would be unconstitutional if 
approved, such claim being premature.”). This limitation dates back to the early years after 
the adoption of the initiative. See Weinland v. Fulton, 121 N.E. 816, 816 (Ohio 1918) (per 
curiam) (“In an action to enjoin the Secretary of State from submitting for the approval or 
rejection of the electors a constitutional amendment proposed by petition . . . a court cannot 
consider or determine whether such proposed amendment is in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States.”); Pfeifer v. Graves, 104 N.E. 529, syllabus para. 5 (Ohio 
1913). 
 335 See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 331, at 304. 
 336 State ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown, 282 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1972) (per curiam). 
 337 See supra Part XII.C.1 (discussing the one amendment, separate-vote requirement). 
 338 See, e.g., Roahrig, 282 N.E.2d at 586 (stating that “a proposal consists of one 
amendment to the Constitution only so long as each of its subjects bears some reasonable 
relationship to a single general object or purpose” and removing from the ballot the initial 
proposal from the Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission for violating the one 
amendment, separate-vote requirement).  
 339 State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 928 N.E.2d 410, 414 (Ohio 2010) 
(per curiam). 
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Despite its willingness to exercise pre-election judicial review of 
compliance with the one amendment, separate-vote requirement, the Ohio 
Supreme Court has not explained the basis for its unwillingness to exercise 
pre-election judicial review to assure substantive compliance with provisions 
of state or federal law. The notion that a provision of the state constitution may 
be invalid because it violates an earlier enacted substantive provision of the 
same state constitution is difficult to envision,340 but substantive conflicts 
between state constitutions and federal law—whether the federal constitution 
or federal statutes—are commonplace.341 In declining to provide pre-election 
substantive judicial review, the Ohio Supreme Court may simply believe that 
state voters should have the first opportunity to address even arguably 
unconstitutional amendments and that the proper role of the judiciary is to 
defer (at least initially) to the voters. And post-election judicial review in the 
state and federal courts is readily available for determining compliance of state 
constitutional provisions with federal law.342 
Although the Ohio Supreme Court has provided pre-election review to 
enforce the one amendment, separate-vote requirement,343 it has not addressed 
whether it will follow the lead of some other states and provide post-election 
review to strike down an amendment on these grounds after the voters 
approved it.344 
The availability of judicial review for alleged violations of the 
amendment-revision distinction and the antimonopoly amendment will be new 
                                                                                                                     
 340 See Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help Fla., 363 So.2d 337, 341–42 
(Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (“When a newly adopted amendment does conflict with 
preexisting constitutional provisions, the new amendment necessarily supersedes the 
previous provisions.”). 
 341 See MILLER, supra note 295, at 101–23 (discussing how courts have defended and 
checked the initiative process).  
 342 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that an initiated 
state constitutional amendment limiting marriage to same-sex couples violates the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Omaha Nat’l Bank v. 
Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1986) (holding that an initiated state constitutional 
amendment that prohibited corporations from holding title to ranch or agricultural land did 
not violate either the federal National Bank Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 343 See supra Part XII.C.1. 
 344 See Lehman v. Bradbury, 37 P.2d 989, 990 (Or. 2002) (throwing out a voter-
approved initiated constitutional amendment adopting a legislative term limit provision for 
state legislators because the provision was not closely related to the provision limiting the 
terms of members of Congress); cf. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Cal. 1990) 
(addressing but rejecting the merits of a post-election single-subject challenge to an 
initiated amendment that barred the state courts from construing the California Constitution 
to provide criminal or juvenile defendants with greater protections than available under 
federal law); Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 18–22 (Fla. 2000) (providing post-election 
judicial review to hold that a legislative-proposed voter-approved constitutional 
amendment relating to the Florida death penalty did not comply with the accuracy 
requirement of the Florida Constitution). 
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issues for the Ohio courts. In addressing these issue, the Ohio Supreme Court 
will have to determine whether these limitations are closer to substantive 
limitations, which are not subject to pre-election judicial review, or to the one 
amendment, separate-vote requirement and other ballot-supervision 
requirements, which are subject to pre-election judicial review. 
XIII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS AND COMMISSIONS TODAY 
Constitutional conventions, once the principal method for revising state 
constitutions,345 have fallen out of favor, and Professor Robert F. Williams, 
one of the nation’s leading state constitutional scholars and a participant in this 
Symposium,346 has observed that they “seem to have lost their legitimacy in 
the public mind.”347  
Since 1776, there have been 233 state conventions in the United States, 
but 170 of them took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.348 The 
trend away from state constitutional conventions as tools of constitutional 
revision in the twentieth century is clear, but the pattern is not. In the first half 
of the century there were twenty-seven state constitutional conventions, 
largely the result of the Progressive Movement.349 Since 1950 there were 
thirty-six state constitutional conventions in twenty states,350 in part the result 
of the Supreme Court’s reapportionment decisions.351 As a direct result of 
these conventions, eleven states adopted new or inaugural constitutions since 
1950,352 but the last time a state has used a convention to adopt a new 
                                                                                                                     
 345 DINAN, supra note 84, at 7 (“For much of American history . . . the constitutional 
convention was the primary forum for debating and revising state foundational 
documents.”).  
346 See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and 
the Evolving Development of State Constitutional Law, 77 OHIO ST. L.J 203 (2016). 
 347 Robert F. Williams, Should the Oregon Constitution Be Revised, and If So, How 
Should It Be Accomplished?, OR. L. REV. 867, 901 (2008). 
 348 DINAN, supra note 84, at 7–8. 
 349 See BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, Table 1.1, supra note 5, at 11 (listing dates of state 
constitutional conventions). 
 350 Thirteen states had only one convention during this period; the other seven had 
twenty-three conventions. See DINAN, supra note 84, at 8–9; see also BOOK OF THE STATES 
2015, Table 1.1, supra note 5, at 11. 
 351 Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 56, 
72–73 (1982). 
 352 States that adopted new constitutions as a result of conventions since 1950, listed 
chronologically by date of adoption, include: Hawaii (1950), Alaska (1956), Michigan 
(1963), Connecticut (1965), Florida (1968); Pennsylvania (1968), Illinois (1970), North 
Carolina (1970), Montana (1972), Louisiana (1974), and Rhode Island (1986). See ROBERT 
F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 364–76 (2009); Sturm, supra 
note 351, at 73. 
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constitution was Rhode Island in 1986.353 And since 1950, voters rejected 
convention-proposed constitutions in six states.354 
Disillusionment with constitutional conventions, the rejection by voters of 
proposed new constitutions, and the general acceptability of commissions to 
state legislators heightened the use of state constitutional revision 
commissions. In 1982, Professor Albert L. Sturm reported that between 1938 
and 1961 states held forty constitutional conventions, but during this period 
states created eighty-six commissions to address their constitutions.355  
Constitutional revision commissions come in many different forms. The 
common feature is that, with the exception of the unique Florida Constitutional 
Revision Commission, state revision commissions do not have authority to 
place proposed amendments directly on the ballot.356 Typically, commissions 
make recommendations directly to the legislature, and these commissions have 
been successful in Georgia, Virginia, and Ohio but not in California, Alabama, 
and Arkansas.357 Some states have also created commissions to make 
recommendations to support the work of state constitutional conventions that 
have been or that might be created.358 
The success of state constitutional revision commissions is difficult to 
gauge. There is typically no up-or-down vote on a new constitution, but one 
can still look at the quantity and quality of constitutional change that results 
from the use of a commission. And whatever the measure of success, scholars 
who have studied the use of constitutional revision have looked to whether 
                                                                                                                     
 353 The 1986 Rhode Island Constitutional Convention did not present the voters with 
an up-and-down vote on a new constitution but put fourteen proposals on the ballot. The 
voters approved eight of them, and Rhode Island treats the state as having adopted a new 
constitution in 1986. See generally R.I. CONST.; see also J.H. Snider & Beverly Clay, 
Constitutional Convention and the Out-of-State-Money Bogeyman, PROVIDENCE J.  
(Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20141024/OPINION/310249896 
[https://perma.cc/BM9D-4PLV]. 
 354 States in which the voters rejected constitutions proposed by conventions during 
this period include: New York (1967), Maryland (1968), Rhode Island (1968), New 
Mexico (1969), Arkansas (1970), and North Dakota (1972). See Sturm, supra note 351, at 
73 n.55 (describing failures through 1981). 
 355 See id. at 86; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 352, at 364–76. 
 356 WILLIAMS, supra note 352, at 370. The Florida Constitutional Revision 
Commission, which was created by the state constitution, has the power to place proposed 
amendments directly on the ballot without any involvement of the state legislature. See id. 
at 369–71. 
 357 See id. at 366–74 (discussing successful uses of constitutional revision commissions 
in Florida and Virginia and the failures in California and Alabama); see also Dinan, supra 
note 4, at 4 (discussing the lack of progress with the Alabama Constitutional Revision 
Commission); Walter H. Nunn, The Commission Route to Constitutional Reform: The 
Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK L. REV. 317 (1969). The 1970s Ohio Constitutional Revision 
Commission has not received any academic attention. But see infra Part XIV. 
 358 WILLIAMS, supra note 352, at 364–76. State constitutional study commissions were 
used successfully to support the work of constitutional conventions in Michigan and 
Montana, but the New York experience was not successful. See id. at 367–71. 
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there are controversial issues, the timing of the process, the existence of 
bipartisan support for constitutional reform, the leadership of key political 
leaders as well as commissioners, and the presence of public support.359 
Despite the successful experiences of some states with constitutional 
revision commissions, there are limitations. When constitutional revision 
commissions are charged with proposing amendments to the legislature, the 
commissions must work through the same legislative and political minefields 
that have often blocked constitutional revision. As a result, commissions—
though ideally deliberative and able to place their imprimatur of expertise and 
bipartisanship on difficult issues—are part of the existing political system and 
constrained by it.  
As a result, Professor John Dinan has observed that “revision 
commissions . . . are viewed more favorably by legislators who are generally 
able to maintain more control over selecting commission members and 
determining the scope of their work.”360 
XIV. THE OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION 
A. The Creation of the Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission 
The national trend away from state constitutional conventions has been 
reflected in Ohio. Despite the success of the 1912 convention, Ohio voters 
have consistently rejected the mandatory twenty-year convention calls.361 The 
closest vote was in 1932, when 44.7% of the voters supported a convention, 
but in none of the four subsequent elections did more than 40% of the voters 
support a convention.362 
Nonetheless, there was state interest in state constitutional reform before 
the 1952 and 1972 convention calls.363 Prior to the 1952 vote, there was a 
spirited public debate on the convention call.364 The League of Women Voters 
                                                                                                                     
 359 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 347, at 895–98; John Dinan, Accounting for 
Success and Failure of Southern State Constitutional Reform, 1978–2008, 3 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 483, 485–86 (2008). 
 360 John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2012, in BOOK OF THE STATES 
2013, at 3, 4 (2013), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/dinan_2013_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SM54-7PRV]. 
 361 See Calls for Conventions, supra note 76. 
 362 Id.  
 363 See ARCHER REILLY, A Summary of the Campaigns for and Against the 
Constitutional Convention, 25 OHIO B. 685, 685 (1952); see also DINAN, supra note 84, at 
10 (“[T]he 1960s marked the start of another period of intense constitutional activity.”). 
See generally W. DONALD HEISEL & IOLA O. HESSLER, STATE GOVERNMENT FOR OUR 
TIMES: A NEW LOOK AT OHIO’S CONSTITUTION (1970); POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC 
ISSUES IN OHIO (John J. Gargan & James G. Coke eds., 1972) [hereinafter POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR] (discussing a collection of papers following the November 1969 conference at 
Kent State University).  
 364 See REILLY, supra note 363, at 685. 
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of Ohio, working with the Committee for a Constitutional Convention, led the 
campaign for a “yes” vote, believing that a convention was the best way to 
provide a much-needed review of the Ohio Constitution.365 In opposition, the 
Ohio Farm Bureau and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, working with the 
Committee to Protect Ohio’s Constitution, argued that the Constitution was 
sound and that needed changes could be made in other ways.366 Meanwhile, 
members of the Social Sciences Section of the Ohio College Association 
published, with the financial assistance of the Stephen H. Wilder Foundation, a 
monograph containing a series of substantive papers on various topics 
concerning the Ohio Constitution.367 The goal was to educate the voters in the 
hope that they will have “adequate information concerning the nature, virtues 
and shortcomings of the present Ohio state constitution.”368 Educated or not, 
the voters soundly rejected the call on November 4, 1952, with only 34.0% of 
the voters supporting a convention.369 
In the early 1970s, the Stephen H. Wilder Foundation continued its efforts 
and funded and published a number of studies to review the Ohio Constitution 
and to generate interest in the convention call,370 and Kent State University 
held a conference for the same purposes.371 These efforts produced a series of 
excellent papers, focusing primarily on substantive constitutional issues.372 
But no significant popular support emerged for a constitutional convention,373 
and on November 7, 1972, the voters again soundly rejected a convention call 
with only 37.6% of the voters supporting a convention.374 
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 366 See id. at 685–87.  
 367 See generally HARVEY WALKER, AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE OHIO 
CONSTITUTION 1851–1951 (1951). 
 368 Id. at 5. 
 369 Calls for Conventions, supra note 76. 
 370 See HEISEL & HESSLER, supra note 363, at 1–4. 
 371 See POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 363, at 1. 
 372 The papers supported by the Wilder Foundation in 1970, supra note 363, addressed 
taxation, public debt, home rule and local government, and the judiciary. The papers 
presented at the Kent State University conference, supra note 363, addressed Ohio 
government and politics, state and local taxation, the legislature, judicial selection, urban 
policies, and the politics of constitutional revision. In addition, after the creation of the 
OCRC but before the vote on the mandatory call, a Local Government Symposium, co-
sponsored by the Commission, the Ohio State University College of Law, and the Ohio 
Municipal League, addressed issues of local law that involved the state constitution. See 
Howard P. Fink, Symposium: Introduction—Constitutional Aspects of Ohio Local 
Government, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 572, 573–74 (1972) (discussing the Symposium and the 
papers). 
 373 Prior to the 1972 vote, the League of Women Voters of Ohio made the Ohio 
Constitution a statewide study item, but the League, which supported the creation of the 
OCRC, did not take a position on whether there should be a constitutional convention. See 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 363, at v. 
 374 Calls for Conventions, supra note 76. 
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Prior to the 1972 defeat of the constitutional call, there had been some 
interest in constitutional reform through a constitutional revision commission. 
A number of states had used commissions to update their constitutions, and the 
Citizens League proposed the creation of a constitutional revision commission 
patterned after a similar commission in California.375 
Support for a commission also included some who had deep concerns 
about the prospect of a convention and saw the creation of a commission as a 
way to blunt a positive vote on the convention call. For example, in the early 
1970, after the creation of the OCRC but before the mandatory vote, Plain 
Dealer reporter Richard G. Zimmerman, stated that “[t]he very idea [of a 
constitutional convention] sends a chill up my spine.”376 He elaborated: 
This is an era of fear and mistrust, an era of growing tensions between 
the courts and the legislature, between the people and their government. It is a 
time when the gap between generations grows and cries for police state 
tactics increase. . . . In short, it is no time to completely rewrite our basic state 
Constitution.377 
And Columbus Dispatch reporter David Lore described the motivation 
behind the creation of the OCRC: “Hoping to undercut any enthusiasm for 
such a convention, the assembly . . . created the Ohio Constitutional Revision 
Commission, a citizens group, to study constitutional reform and report back 
to the legislature.”378 Finally, and more recently, Mike Curtin Associate 
Publisher Emeritus of the Columbus Dispatch and now a state legislator and a 
member of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission (OCMC), 
reflected on the times: “The late 1960s were politically and socially 
tumultuous, and Statehouse leaders were concerned over the direction a 
constitutional convention might take. The commission was a way to take the 
steam out of any momentum for a 1972 convention call.”379  
On August 26, 1969, with the 1972 vote on the mandatory call still slightly 
more than three years away, Ohio Governor James A. Rhodes signed 
legislation creating the bipartisan Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission 
(OCRC) to study the constitution, to make recommendations of proposed 
amendments to the General Assembly, and to make recommendations to a 
constitutional convention (should the voters support the convention call).380 
                                                                                                                     
 375 See William C. Barnard, Constitution Overhaul Needed, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 
4, 1970, at 16AA. 
 376 Richard G. Zimmerman, No Time to Rewrite Constitution, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, 
Jan. 4, 1970, at 16AA. 
 377 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 378 David Lore, Constitutional Convention Silence Deafens, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Oct. 8, 1972, at 23A. 
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The OCRC was composed of thirty-two members, twelve of whom were 
legislators—six senators and six representatives—with an equal number from 
each of the two major political parties.381 Appointed by the legislative 
leadership, this core group of legislators in turn appointed twenty non-
legislators to serve on the OCRC.382 All commissioners had two-year terms 
but could be reappointed,383 and the OCRC was given ten years to complete its 
work.384 
The General Assembly charged the OCRC with reviewing the Ohio 
Constitution and, by a two-thirds vote, recommending proposed amendments 
to the General Assembly.385 The supermajority voting requirement assured 
that only proposals that could garner strong bipartisan support would be 
approved by the OCRC and recommended to the General Assembly, which, by 
the required three-fifths vote, could propose amendments to the voters.386 
The OCRC got off the ground well in advance of the mandatory call. At its 
initial organizational meeting on January 8, 1970, it selected two legislative 
members from different political parties as cochairmen.387 At its July 28, 1970 
meeting, the legislative members appointed the twenty public members, and at 
the January 21, 1971 meeting, the full commission hired the well-known and 
well regarded Ann M. Eriksson, the former Assistant Director and Chief of 
Legal Services for the nonpartisan Legislative Services Commission, as 
Director of the Commission.388 And on February 18, 1971, though not 
required to do so,389 the OCRC transferred the leadership of the OCRC to the 
                                                                                                                     
 381 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.51 (Anderson 1978) (expired July 1, 1979). 
 382 Id. Nonlegislators did not have party designations, and there was no political party 
diversity requirement concerning the permanent leadership of the Commission. See id. 
 383 Id. 
 384 Id. § 103.56 (expired July 1, 1979).  
 385 Id. § 103.52 (expired July 1, 1979).  
 386 OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
 387 1 OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION 1970–1977, MEETINGS OF THE 
COMMISSION, BEGINNING JANUARY 8, 1970, at 1 (1971) [hereinafter MINUTES OF THE 
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select a Chairman and Vice-Chairman prior to the appointment of public members, thus 
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members to serve as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. See MINUTES OF THE OCRC, supra 
note 387, at 7–8. In 1972, the General Assembly amended the statute governing the OCRC, 
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temporary cochairmen and appoint the nonlegislative members. Am. H.B. 999, 109th Gen. 
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public members by electing Richard C. Carter, a businessman from Fostoria, 
and Linda Unger Orfirer, Associate Director, Health Planning and 
Development Commission, Federation for Community Planning, and an active 
member of the League of Women Voters, as Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
respectively.390 Both these public members held their leadership positions for 
the entire life of the Commission. 
At its March 25, 1971 meeting, the OCRC approved the committee 
structure, which included four standing committees, four subject matter 
committees, and a steering committee, and the Chairman made clear that the 
committee chairs had broad authority over their committees.391 And on 
December 31, 1971, the OCRC made its first report to the General 
Assembly,392 two years after its initial organizational meeting.393 In this 
report, the OCRC recommended numerous amendments, primarily to Article 
II, the Legislative Branch.394 
B. Initial Setbacks 
Despite the speed with which the OCRC organized, hired staff, and began 
its work, plus the widely held view of its success,395 there is another chapter in 
the story. The OCRC had initial difficulty moving its substantive agenda 
forward, and its early recommendations ran into opposition from both the 
courts and the voters.396 Moreover, a number of substantial proposals did not 
get through the OCRC, while the General Assembly did not embrace a 
significant number of the OCRC recommendations.397 
On April 28, 1972, the Ohio Supreme Court removed the OCRC’s first set 
of proposed amendments from the ballot for having violated the one 
amendment, separate-vote requirement.398 And one year later, on May 8, 1973, 
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 390 See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 1–12 (list of members of OCRC and 
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 391 See MINUTES OF THE OCRC, supra note 387, at 12–13. 
 392 Letter from Richard H. Carter, Chairman, Ohio Constitutional Revision Comm’n, 
to the Ohio General Assembly (Dec. 31, 1971), reprinted in OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL 
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 393 See MINUTES OF THE OCRC, supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
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the voters rejected two of the first three proposed amendments to reach 
them.399 
These initial setbacks caused the OCRC to review its operations, to focus 
more on the job of educating the public, and to consider the need to address a 
problem with the constitutional amendment process that many believed had 
made it difficult for the voters to understand the issues that were coming 
before them.400 
This led to the OCRC’s first recommendation concerning the amendment 
process itself, and on December 31, 1973, the OCRC delivered to the General 
Assembly a report recommending an amendment to create the Ohio Ballot 
Board and establish standards for the ballot language being presented to the 
voters.401 Chairman Carter, correctly it turned out, predicted that this would 
become “one of the most important changes to the Ohio Constitution.”402 His 
transmittal letter identified the proposal as addressing “(1) the need to state 
constitutional issues on the ballot in clear, nontechnical language which can be 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE OHIO CONSTITUTION PART 3 (1973) [hereinafter OCRC PART 3], 
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 402 OCRC PART 3, supra note 401. 
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more easily understood by the voter; and (2) the need to provide the voter with 
better information about proposed constitutional amendments.”403 And the 
voters approved this amendment on May 7, 1974, by a vote of 964,885 to 
376,022.404  
C. OCRC Successes and Failures 
After its initial setbacks, the OCRC began to chalk up successes. During 
the five and one-half years from January 1972 to mid-1977, the OCRC worked 
its way through the Constitution and submitted ten additional reports with 
multiple discrete recommendations to the General Assembly.405 Between 1973 
and 1978, the General Assembly proposed twenty amendments that had their 
origins in recommendations of the OCRC, and the voters approved sixteen of 
them.406 The OCRC completed its work two years short of its July 1, 1979, 
deadline, remarkable for a governmental undertaking, and produced a Final 
Report with detailed recommendations.407 
In reviewing the work of the OCRC, many commentators, including this 
author, have heralded the success of the OCRC, pointing to its superlative 
record before the voters.408 
                                                                                                                     
 403 Id. 
 404 See Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 405 See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 20–21, 24–30. In total, the OCRC 
submitted eleven reports to the General Assembly on the following broad topics: (1) 
Administration, Organization, and Procedures of the General Assembly; (2) State Debt; (3) 
Constitutional Amendments; (4) Taxation; (5) Indirect Debt Limit; (6) Executive Branch; 
(7) Elections and Suffrage; (8) Local Government; (9) Initiative and Referendum; (10) 
Judiciary; and (11) Bill of Rights. Id. at table of contents. In addition, the OCRC set up a 
What’s Left Committee to review issues that were not addressed in the reports that had 
been submitted earlier. Id. at 18. These reports are all included in the Final Report of the 
OCRC. Id. apps. A–K. 
 406 Ohio Constitution—Law and History: Constitutional Revision Commission  
1970–1977, CLEV.-MARSHALL L. LIBR., http://guides.law.csuohio.edu/ohioconstitution/ 
ohioconstitutionalrevisioncommission [https://perma.cc/HXT5-QYXN] (last updated Feb. 
14, 2016) [hereinafter Constitutional Revision Commission]; see also OCRC FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 250, at 24–30 (summary of the OCRC’s recommended constitutional 
amendments and results as of May 1, 1977). 
 407 Letter from Richard H. Carter, Chairman, Ohio Constitutional Revision Comm’n, 
to the Ohio General Assembly (May 1, 1977), reprinted in OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 250 (advising the General Assembly of the early completion date). The OCRC also 
produced a ten-volume treasure trove of proceedings, research studies, and other 
memoranda in addition to a Final Report, all of which are available on-line at Ohio 
Constitutional Revision Commission Reports 1970–1977, OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMMISSION, 
http://www.lsc.ohio.gov/ocrc/ [https://perma.cc/3VZU-3VG3]. 
 408 E.g., Curtin, supra note 379; Steven H. Steinglass, Constitutional Commission Is 
the Way to Go, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 27, 2011), http://www.dispatch.com/ 
content/stories/editorials/2011/07/27/constitutional-commission-is-the-way-to-go.html [https:// 
perma.cc/5NZ5-KFKJ]. 
2016] CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION: OHIO STYLE 341 
The successes of the OCRC included (but were not limited to) important 
recommendations involving: (1) a major reorganization of the procedures 
governing the General Assembly (May 1973); (2) the creation of the Ohio 
Ballot Board and the establishment of standards for ballot language (May 
1974); (3) the joint election of the governor and the lieutenant governor and 
the revision of the lieutenant governor’s duties (June 1976); (4) changes in 
voting requirements, including the reduction of voting age to eighteen and the 
repeal of the unconstitutional durational residency requirement (June 1976); 
(5) changes in gubernatorial succession in case of disability or vacancy in the 
office of governor or lieutenant governor (November 1976); (6) the expansion 
of the authority of the newly created Ohio Ballot Board to include the 
preparation of ballot language for proposed initiated amendments, the 
application of new provisions for proposed initiated amendments, and the 
grant of exclusive, original jurisdiction to the Ohio Supreme Court in cases 
challenging the adoption or submission of proposed amendments (June 1978); 
and (7) the modification of procedures for adopting, amending, and repealing 
county charters (November 1978).409 On the other, hand the voters rejected 
four proposed amendments, including the two that had been defeated in May 
1973 and two involving state and local debt that were defeated in June 1976 
and November 1977.410 
These numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The OCRC, by its 
count, made sixty-three discrete recommendations to the General Assembly.411 
Because a number of proposed amendments that appeared on the ballot 
included more than one recommendation for constitutional change, the sixteen 
approved ballot measures actually included twenty-eight different OCRC 
recommendations.412 Similarly, the four rejected amendments included 
fourteen different OCRC recommendations.413 As a result, one-third of the 
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(4) the repeal of the $750,000 limitation on state indebtedness and the delegation of the 
power to the General Assembly by a three-fifths vote to contract debt for capital 
improvements (November 1977). See Constitutional Revision Commission, supra note 406.  
 411 See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 24–30 (summary of OCRC 
recommendations). 
 412 Compare OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 24–30 (summary of OCRC 
recommendations), with Constitutional Revision Commission, supra note 406. 
 413 Compare OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 24–30 (summary of OCRC 
recommendations), with Constitutional Revision Commission, supra note 406. For 
example, the proposed amendment to revise Article VIII concerning state debt actually 
contained ten discrete OCRC recommendations. See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, 
at 27. 
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sixty-three OCRC recommendations died in the General Assembly without 
being presented to the voters.414 Finally, a number of proposed amendments 
did not get the two-thirds vote from the Commission that would have 
permitted them to reach the General Assembly.415 
The difficult question is why the proposals that did not get out of the 
Commission died. One likely explanation is that these proposals, regardless of 
their merits, were, in large part, controversial. The reports of the OCRC, 
including the minority statements, for example, on changes in compensation 
for public officials during their terms, on workers’ compensation, on the rights 
of the handicapped and disabled, on apportionment, and on judicial selection, 
make this clear.416 The proposed amendments on these issues were all likely to 
engender serious opposition, and the refusal of two-thirds of the Commission 
to support them may have only presaged what would likely have happened in 
the General Assembly. 
With respect to the recommendations that died in the General Assembly, 
there are undoubtedly multiple explanations why the General Assembly did 
not support one-third of the OCRC recommendations. However, short of a 
thorough and lengthy examination of the trip taken by each of the unsuccessful 
proposals, one can only speculate about the reasons for their demise.417  
                                                                                                                     
 414 Compare OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 24–30 (summary of OCRC 
recommendations), with Constitutional Revision Commission, supra note 406. The twenty-
one OCRC recommendations that never got out of the General Assembly included 
amendments to (a) repeal a provision permitting courts and juries to consider the failure of 
an accused to testify in a criminal case and permitting prosecutors to comment on the 
failure to testify; (b) provide an alternative to the grand jury, expand the rights of persons 
called before grand juries, and require the presentation of exculpatory evidence; (c) permit 
the General Assembly to reduce the number of counties; (d) permit workers compensation 
to be provided through a state fund or private insurance; (e) consolidate trial courts and 
make other changes concerning the organization of the courts; (f) repeal of a provision 
denying the right to vote to any “idiot, or insane” person; and (g) repeal the requirement 
that a person appointed to office be an elector when appointed but requiring the appointee 
to become a resident when assuming the office. 
 415 See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 40–42, 44–48, 52–71, 74–81, 397–
400, 427–35 (discussing issues on which the OCRC did not make recommendations to 
amend the constitution). For reasons that differed from issue to issue, the OCRC was not 
able to put together a two-thirds vote in support of a number of proposals that had 
generated interest among the commissioners, including the prohibition in the compensation 
of public officials during their existing terms. Id. (discussing workers’ compensation, 
education, the rights of the handicapped and disabled, apportionment, and judicial 
selection). 
 416 See, e.g., id. at 42 (compensation of state officers), 48 (worker’s compensation), 
70–71 (aid to the handicapped and disabled), 79–81 (apportionment), and 427–35 (judicial 
selection).  
 417 The General Assembly accepted some recommendations of the OCRC but only in 
part. For example, the initial recommendation on the initiative and referendum would have 
reorganized the relevant provisions of Articles II and XVI, substituted a fixed number of 
signatures for the percentage approach, and eliminated the geographic distribution 
requirement. See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 250, at 25; see also OCRC PART 9, 
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To evaluate the work of the OCRC, one should start with its successes, 
and the successes have multiple explanations. The OCRC operated in an era in 
which Ohio legislators were willing to put partisanship aside in the search for 
bipartisan approaches to public issues. The practice was to appoint committed 
legislators to the OCRC.418 And the two-thirds rule assured that only proposals 
with broad bipartisan support could get through the commission.419 
Of course, the legislative members were ultimately responsible for the 
biennial appointments of public members, filling vacancies, and convincing 
their colleagues in the General Assembly to move recommendations to the 
ballot.420 The legislative members were willing to place the leadership of the 
Commission in the hands of the public members, and give them day-to-day 
control of the OCRC. And much of the success of the OCRC has been 
attributed to the “commitment and continuity of the public members”421 and to 
the quality of the staff.422  
Even though the public members of the OCRC played a leadership role, 
the General Assembly did not view its role as merely rubber-stamping 
commission proposals. The members of the General Assembly exercised 
independent judgment about which proposals they would move forward.423 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 250. The General Assembly did not accept these aspects of the recommendation 
but did send a more modest proposal to the voters for their approval. See Am. Sub. H.J. 
Res No. 12 (Nov. 23, 1977). The voters approved the proposed amendment on June 6, 
1978. See Table of Proposed Amendment, supra note 139. 
 418 CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMM’N COLLOQUIUM PLANNING COMM., 
SUMMARY OF A COLLOQUIUM (Mar. 22, 2012) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF COLLOQUIUM], 
http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/uploads/OCMC/2012-12-10ColloquiumSummary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DN4S-V4RY]. 
 419 See infra notes 456–60 and accompanying text (discussing the presentations at the 
Colloquium). 
 420 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 103.51–.52 (Anderson 1978) (expired July 1, 1979). 
 421 SUMMARY OF COLLOQUIUM, supra note 418 (describing the Colloquium’s Lessons 
from the 1970s Ohio Revision Commission panel). The continuity of service of the public 
members was noteworthy. Nine of the original twenty public members remained on the 
OCRC for its entire life, and the two public members serving as chairman and vice-
chairman held their leadership positions for the duration. See OCRC FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 252, at 1 (listing members of the OCRC and identifying original members). In total, 
thirty-three public members served in the twenty positions, and they came from a broad 
array of backgrounds with only four having served in the General Assembly. Id. at 2–12 
(biographical sketches of members). On the other hand, the twelve legislative positions 
turned over frequently, and thirty-six different legislators filled the twelve legislative slots 
over the life of the OCRC. Id. at 1. 
 422 Colloquium on the Constitutional Modernization Commission, OHIO CHANNEL 
56:10–:30 (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileId= 
134888 [https://perma.cc/Z2QJ-88PX] [hereinafter Colloquium Recording] (covering the 
Lessons Learned from the 1970s Ohio Revision Commission panel discussion between Jo 
Ann Davidson, Judge Alan E. Norris, and John C. McDonald); see also SUMMARY OF 
COLLOQUIUM, supra note 418. 
 423 Interview with John C. McDonald, OCRC Member (1969–1971) and Ohio State 
Representative (1965–1970), Ohio Gen. Assembly (Jan. 20, 2016). 
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Undoubtedly, questions of politics and timing, and in many instances both, 
prevented the emergence of the requisite three-fifths vote needed to put an 
item on the ballot. It is not inconsistent with the spirit of bipartisanship for 
legislators to have disagreements, even partisan disagreements, but the 
disagreements that took place among the legislative members did not have 
today’s partisan rancor. This was an important contribution to the success of 
the OCRC.424 
Finally, there is some evidence that members of the General Assembly 
were reluctant to put too many proposed amendments on the ballot in any one 
election. Prior to 1912 proposed constitutional amendments could only be 
placed on the general election ballot,425 and the most issues at any one election 
was five in 1857 and 1903.426 Since 1912, when the voters approved an 
amendment to permit General Assembly proposed amendments (though not 
initiated amendments) to appear on any ballot,427 there has been only one 
election (in a non-OCRC year) in which more than five issues were on the 
ballot.428  
In the ten primary and general elections from May 1974 to November 
1978, thirty-seven proposed amendments were on the ballot, including ten 
initiated amendments, thirteen amendments with OCRC origins, and fourteen 
legislatively proposed amendments not based on OCRC recommendations.429 
In three of these elections, more issues were on the ballot than in any election 
other than the iconic 1912 election.430 Indeed, in each of the three elections in 
the peak OCRC ballot years—November 1975 to November 1976—the ballot 
included seven or more issues.431 These were crowded ballots for Ohio, and 
this may have made the General Assembly reluctant to move too many issues 
to the voters.  
In conclusion, it is not fair to criticize the OCRC because the General 
Assembly did not embrace one-third of its recommendations. Constitutional 
revision commissions have significant limitations, and they are not well-suited 
for fundamental constitutional change.432 The legislative process is complex, 
                                                                                                                     
 424 See SUMMARY OF COLLOQUIUM, supra note 418; Colloquium Recording, supra note 
422, at 53:25–54:30, 59:40–61:30 (covering the Lessons Learned from the 1970s Ohio 
Revision Commission panel discussion between Jo Ann Davidson, Judge Alan E. Norris, 
and John C. McDonald). 
 425 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 426 See Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 427 Compare OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1851) (submission at election for state 
legislators), with OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1912) (submission to the voters at special or 
general election); see also 1912 DEBATES, supra note 187, at 171–72. 
 428 See Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. The November 3, 1953 ballot 
was an outlier; it contained nine legislatively proposed amendments, six of which sought to 
repeal obsolete or unconstitutional provisions. See id. 
 429 Id. 
 430 Id. 
 431 Id. 
 432 See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
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and there are multiple explanations why various proposals failed to clear the 
General Assembly, including political and timing issues. Nonetheless, despite 
the clear success of the use of the OCRC to revise the Ohio Constitution, many 
important proposals did not get to the voters.433 
XV. THE COLLOQUIUM PLANNING COMMITTEE AND THE OHIO 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION 
A. The Creation of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission 
In 2011, one year before the scheduled vote on the mandatory convention 
call, the General Assembly created the Ohio Constitutional Modernization 
Commission (OCMC).434 The case for a study commission in preference to a 
convention had been made in 2010 by Mike Curtin, who reviewed the work of 
the OCRC and argued that “Ohio has not had a constitutional convention since 
1912 and doesn’t need one now. But it does need constitutional revision.”435 
The case for a convention had been made a few years earlier by Thomas 
Suddes, a well-known Plain Dealer columnist.436  
Veteran legislator and Speaker of the House William G. Batchelder437 
embraced the Curtin suggestion and became the primary sponsor of the 
                                                                                                                     
 433 See SUMMARY OF COLLOQUIUM, supra note 418 (urging the OCMC to consider the 
unsuccessful proposals of the OCRC); Colloquium Recording, supra note 422, at 67:02–
68:40 (covering the Lessons Learned from the 1970s Ohio Revision Commission panel 
discussion between Jo Ann Davidson, Judge Alan E. Norris, and John C. McDonald). 
 434 Am. H.B. 188, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). 
 435 Curtin, supra note 378.  
 436 Thomas Suddes, The Ohio Constitution: Is it Time for a Re-Write?, CLEV. PLAIN 
DEALER, Dec. 17, 2006, at M1–M3 (arguing Ohio needs a constitutional convention). But 
see Steven H. Steinglass, The Ohio Constitution: Is it Time for a Re-Write?, CLEV. PLAIN 
DEALER, Dec. 17, 2006, at M1–M3 (arguing against a convention and suggesting the 
creation of a constitutional revision commission).  
 437 Speaker Batchelder was elected to the Ohio House of Representatives in 1968, and 
he served until 1998, see End of an Era: Bill Batchelder’s Legacy in Ohio House Spans 38 
Years, GAZETTE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://medinagazette.northcoastnow.com/2014/12/22/end-
era-bill-batchelders-legacy-ohio-house-spans-38-years/ [https://perma.cc/86GE-CRKX], when 
the 1992 initiated constitutional amendment imposing eight-year chamber-specific term 
limits on members of the General Assembly prevented him from seeking re-election. See 
OHIO CONST. art. II, § 2. In 2007, he was re-elected to the House of Representatives, and he 
served as Speaker from 2011 to 2014, see GAZETTE, supra, when he was again barred from 
seeking re-election by the term limits amendment. He served as Co-Chair of the OCMC 
from December 28, 2011, until he left the General Assembly at the end of 2014. See OHIO 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (Dec. 10, 2015) 
[hereinafter 2015 OCMC ANNUAL REPORT]; OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION 
COMM’N, 2013–2014 BIENNIAL REPORT 2 (Dec. 11, 2014) [hereinafter 2013–2014 OCMC 
BIENNIAL REPORT]; OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT OF 
PROCEEDINGS 7 (Dec. 10, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 OCMC REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS]. 
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proposed bipartisan legislation.438 The bill passed the House by a 97–1 vote 
and the Senate by a 32–1 vote; Governor John Kasich signed the legislation on 
July 15, 2011,439 and it became effective on October 17, 2011.440 
Modeled after the OCRC, the OCMC also consisted of thirty-two 
members of whom twelve were legislators, equally divided by party and 
chamber.441 The remaining twenty members were public members whom the 
legislative members appointed.442 The broad charge to study the Ohio 
Constitution and, by a two-thirds vote, make recommendations to the General 
Assembly for constitutional amendments was identical to the charge given to 
the OCRC,443 and the General Assembly also gave the OCMC a ten-year term 
to complete its work.444 And, as with the statute creating the OCRC, the 
statute creating the OCMC provided that if the voters approved the convention 
call, the OCMC would be required to “report to the general assembly its 
recommendations with respect to the organization of a convention, and report 
to the convention its recommendations with respect to amendment of the 
Constitution.”445 
The major statutory difference between the OCRC and the OCMC 
concerned the leadership structure of the commission. In the 1970s, the statute, 
as amended, provided for a chairman and a vice-chairman, and all members of 
the OCRC were eligible to serve in those positions.446 The OCMC, on the 
other hand, has cochairs, and the timing of their selection effectively requires 
that they be legislators.447 
B. The Colloquium Planning Committee 
In response to the creation of the OCMC, faculty members of the Ohio 
State University Moritz College of Law created a new organization, the 
                                                                                                                     
 438 See Steinglass, supra note 408. 
 439 Id. 
 440 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.61 (West 2016) (enacted by Am. H.B. 188, 129th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011)). 
 441 Id. § 103.63. 
 442 Id. 
 443 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.52 (Anderson 1978) (expired July 1, 1979), 
with id. § 103.61 (West 2016). 
 444 Id. § 103.67 (West 2016) (giving OCMC until July 1, 2021, to complete its work). 
But see Am. Sub. H.B. 64, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015) (reducing the term 
of the OCMC to six and one-half years to January 1, 2018). 
 445 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.62 (West 2016). 
 446 See id. § 103.51 (Anderson 1978). 
 447 Id. § 103.63 (West 2016). The statute creating the OCMC initially required that the 
co-chairs be from different political parties, but in 2013 the General Assembly amended it 
to also require that they be from different chambers. See id., as amended by Am. Sub. H.B. 
59 § 101.01, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2013). 
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Colloquium Planning Committee.448 Facilitated by Professor Nancy Rogers, 
former Dean of the College of Law, the Planning Committee assembled an 
experienced and diverse group of nineteen individuals for the purpose of 
providing assistance to help the OCMC move forward.449 
The dual strategy of the Planning Committee was the preparation of a 
Report that would provide process-based guidance to the OCMC and the 
sponsorship of a Colloquium to examine commission-based state 
constitutional revision.450 But unlike the efforts prior to the 1952 and 1972 
votes on the convention calls, the Planning Committee did not identify 
substantive constitutional issues that needed to be addressed; nor did it express 
a view on the need for a constitutional convention. Nonetheless, the Report 
issued by the Planning Committee implicitly accepted the need to modernize 
the Ohio Constitution.  
Meeting from November 2011 to January 2012 and supported by research 
fellows and law students from the Moritz College of Law, the Planning 
Committee reviewed the history of the Ohio Constitution and efforts to amend 
it, particularly the work of the OCRC in the 1970s, as well as the experiences 
of other states that had undertaken commission-based constitutional 
revision.451 It also looked at the research on public participation and group 
decision-making, and its 90-page report identified process options that the 
OCMC could consider to permit it to move forward quickly and efficiently.452 
The Colloquium, which was the culmination of the work of the Planning 
Committee, was a public event held in Columbus on March 22, 2012,453 at a 
time when the legislative members of the OCMC had not yet filled the public 
member slots on the Commission.  
Neither the Colloquium Planning Committee nor the program that it 
sponsored had any official status, but the Colloquium received support from 
                                                                                                                     
 448 THE OHIO STATE UNIV. MORITZ COLL. OF LAW, OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL 
MODERNIZATION COLLOQUIUM 2 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter COLLOQUIUM REPORT], 
http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/uploads/OCMC/colloquium_materials_3-22.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CN76-KATN]. 
 449 The members of the Planning Committee were James A. Brogan, Jo Ann Davidson, 
Robert M. Duncan, Eric Fingerhut, Edward B. Foley, Nathaniel R. Jones, Charles Kurfess, 
Joan W. Lawrence, Cynthia Lazarus, Harry J. Lehman, Betty Montgomery, John N. Ong, 
Nancy H. Rogers, Ben Rose, Richard B. Saphire, Zack Space, Steven H. Steinglass, Bob 
Taft, and William K. Weisenberg. Id. at 72–90. The Committee included several former 
judges, former state legislators, former Speakers of the Ohio House, law professors, former 
members of Congress, former Ohio Attorneys General, and a former Ohio Governor. Id. at 
app. E. Four members of the Colloquium Planning Committee were eventually appointed 
as public members of the OCMC: Jo Ann Davidson, Charles Kurfess, Richard B. Saphire, 
and Bob Taft. 2013–2014 OCMC BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 437, at 2. The OCMC also 
hired this author as Senior Policy Advisor. Id. at 3.  
 450 COLLOQUIUM REPORT, supra note 448, at 2–3. 
 451 See COLLOQUIUM REPORT, supra note 448, at 4. 
 452 See generally COLLOQUIUM REPORT, supra note 449. 
 453 See generally SUMMARY OF COLLOQUIUM, supra note 418. 
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the embryonic OCMC. The program included presentations from the OCMC 
co-chairs, from members of the Planning Committee, from members of the 
OCRC, and from academic experts.454 The presentations included reviews of 
the history of the Ohio Constitution, of the work of the OCRC, of efforts at 
constitutional revision nationally, and of the recommendations contained in the 
Colloquium Planning Report.455 
Of particular relevance were presentations reviewing the work of the 
OCRC by two of its legislative members, Honorable Alan E. Norris, Senior 
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and John C. 
McDonald, both of whom had served in leadership positions in the Ohio 
House of Representatives.456 Reflecting on the success of the OCRC, they 
both pointed to the lack of partisanship within the OCRC, to the two-thirds 
voting requirement, to the important role played by the public members, and to 
the strength of the staff. And they both emphasized the importance of 
engaging legislative members from the beginning of the process so that they 
would be able to sell commission recommendations to their colleagues. Judge 
Norris also emphasized the special role of the two-thirds voting requirement: 
The two-thirds majority requirement will tamp down the enthusiasm of the 
majority and give comfort to the concerns of the minority. Having a two-
thirds majority requirement means that members have to listen to each other 
with an open mind and be willing to listen to people with divergent 
viewpoints. Disagreements occurred in the 1970s, but they were not 
partisan.457 
In addition, there was an insightful presentation by Professor Robert F. 
Williams on the national experience with constitutional revision, particularly 
commission-based constitutional revision.458 Professor Williams emphasized 
the need to avoid being too ambitious, the danger of embracing issues that 
were too controversial, the importance of public involvement, and the 
importance of strong leadership within the commission and in the larger 
political community.459  
                                                                                                                     
 454 Id. 
 455 COLLOQUIUM REPORT, supra note 449. See generally Colloquium Recording, supra 
note 422. 
 456 Colloquium Recording, supra note 422, at 49:36–51:45 (introducing the Lessons 
Learned from the 1970s Ohio Revision Commission panel discussion between Jo Ann 
Davidson, Judge Alan Norris, and John C. McDonald). 
 457 SUMMARY OF COLLOQUIUM, supra note 418 (citations omitted); accord Colloquium 
Recording, supra note 422, at 54:00–61:00. 
 458 Colloquium Recording, supra note 422, at 25:20–48:20 (presentation by Robert F. 
Williams on Experience of Constitutional Commissions Across the States: What Are the 
Keys to Success or Failure?); see also SUMMARY OF COLLOQUIUM, supra note 418 
(summarizing presentation by Professor Williams). 
 459 Colloquium Recording, supra note 422, at 25:20–48:20. 
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C. The Organization, the Work, and the Future of the Ohio 
Constitutional Modernization Commission 
Notwithstanding the valuable work of the Colloquium Planning 
Committee, the OCMC had difficulty getting started.460 The statute creating 
the OCMC became effective on October 17, 2011, but there was not a full 
slate of commissioners in place until December 10, 2012,461 and the 
Commission was not fully staffed until the summer of 2014.462  
Nonetheless, during 2013, even before the appointment of a full-time staff, 
the OCMC had begun addressing both organizational and substantive issues 
with the assistance of borrowed legislative staff and a part-time consultant.463 
To begin its comprehensive review of the Ohio Constitution, the OCMC 
divided itself into six subject-matter committees each of which had four 
legislative members, divided by party and generally by chamber, and six or 
seven public members.464 Each OCMC member was assigned to serve on two 
                                                                                                                     
 460 The statute creating the OCRC became effective on November 26, 1969. OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 103.51 (Anderson 1978). By its January 21, 1971 meeting, a period of almost 
fourteen months, the public members had been appointed and the Director of the 
Commission had been hired. MINUTES OF THE OCRC, supra note 387, at 2, 5. The OCMC, 
however, did not proceed as quickly, and it took from October 17, 2011 until March 13, 
2014, a period of almost twenty-nine months, for the OCMC to take these steps. See OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 103.61 (West. 2016) (reporting that OCMC was effectively established 
on October 17, 2011); OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMM’N, MINUTES (Mar. 
13, 2014), http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/uploads/OCMC/2014-03-13%20Minutes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L9JK-HUS3] (reporting that the Executive Director of the OCMC was 
not hired until March 13, 2014); 2012 OCMC REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 437, at 
3, 10 (reporting that the twenty public members of the OCMC were not appointed until 
September 13, 2012, and did not attend their first meeting until December 10, 2012).  
 461 See 2012 OCMC REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 437, at 10. The process for 
selecting the public members of the OCMC had begun shortly after the legislative 
members of the OCMC had their initial organizational meeting on December 28, 2011, but 
the selection process was extended because more than 250 people expressed interest in 
serving in these pro bono positions. Id. at 7, 10.  
 462 OCMC 2013–2014 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 449, at 3. The OCMC appointed 
its Executive Director on March 13, 2014, and he began working on May 1, 2014. Id. After 
the Executive Director was hired, the staffing of the OCMC proceeded quickly. See id. The 
staff includes an Executive Director, a Counsel to the Commission, a Communications 
Director, an Administrative Assistant, and a part-time policy advisor. Id. The budget of the 
OCMC is $600,000, annually, beginning in fiscal year 2013. Am. Sub. H.B. 59, 130th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2013). 
 463 The author of this Article was the initial consultant for the OCMC and continued in 
that position until hired as Senior Policy Advisor for the OCMC. See OHIO 
CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMM’N, MINUTES (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/uploads/OCMC/2013-09-12_Minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MZ35-9BU3].  
 464 See 2013–2014 OCMC BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 449, at 5–13. The six subject 
committees include the following: Bill of Rights and Voting Committee; Constitutional 
Revision and Updating Committee; Education, Public Institutions, and Local Government 
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subject-matter committees, and public members were appointed to serve as 
Chair and Vice-Chair of all the OCMC committees.465 
During 2015, the OCMC approved two recommendations for proposed 
amendments both of which came from the Judicial Branch and the 
Administration of Justice Committee.466 These recommendations were for the 
repeal of obsolete provisions of Article IV authorizing the General Assembly 
to create courts of conciliation to provide an alternative to traditional 
adjudication467 and to create supreme court commissions to address the 
backlog in cases.468 The General Assembly had never created a court of 
conciliation, and 1883 was the last time it had created a supreme court 
commission.469  
Not all the work of state constitutional revision commissions involves 
changes in state constitutions, and state constitutions, including the Ohio 
Constitution, have many provisions that do not need to be changed. By the end 
of 2015, the subject-matter committees of the OCMC had approved Reports 
and Recommendations identifying nine constitutional provisions that did not 
need to be amended or repealed, and the full OCMC approved seven of these 
recommendations with the others in the pipeline.470 Finally, the OCMC and its 
committees are currently considering multiple proposals for constitutional 
changes and for “no change,” and it is likely that the Commission will be 
making a series of recommendations to the General Assembly during the 
balance of 2016. 
                                                                                                                     
Committee; Finance, Taxation, and Economic Development Committee; Judicial Branch 
and Administration of Justice Committee; and Legislative Branch and Executive Branch 
Committee. Id. 
 465 See id. In addition, the OCMC created the following four standing committees to 
address administrative issues: Organization and Administration Committee, Public 
Education and Information Committee, Liaisons with Public Offices Committee, and 
Coordinating Committee. Id. Each standing committees had three legislative members and 
five public members, with public members serving as Chair and Vice-chair of each. See id. 
at 14–16. 
 466 2015 OCMC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 437, at 7.  
 467 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 19; see OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMM’N, 
MINUTES (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter OCMC APRIL 2015 MINUTES], http:// 
www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/uploads/OCMC/OCMC%20-%20Approved%20Minutes%20to 
%20Post%20(2015.04.09).pdf [https://perma.cc/5MEL-8BH4]. 
 468 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 22; see OCMC APRIL 2015 MINUTES, supra note 467,  
at 4–5. 
 469 STEINGLASS & SCARSELLI, supra note 3, at 207–09. 
 470 Reports and Recommendations, OHIO CONST. MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, 
http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc/reports [https://perma.cc/34KU-7TTK]. By the end of 
2015, the OCMC approved recommendations that the following constitutional provisions 
not be changed: Article I, Section 2 (Right to Alter, Reform, or Abolish Government, and 
Repeal Special Privileges); Article I, Section 3 (Right to Assemble); Article I, Section 4 
(Bearing Arms, Standing Armies, and Military Power); Article I, Section 13 (Quartering 
Troops); Article I, Section 17 (No Hereditary Privileges); Article VI, Section 1 (Funds for 
Religious and Educational Purposes); and Article VI, Section 2 (School Funds). Id. 
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The OCMC is limited by statute to recommending constitutional 
amendments to the General Assembly,471 but this formal requirement does not 
prevent its legislative members from working to have the General Assembly 
move issues under consideration to the ballot before the OCMC has completed 
its work. And this happened in 2014 and 2015 on two very visible issues, 
resulting in the approval by the voters on November 3, 2015, of the new 
Article XI on state apportionment472 and the state’s only substantive limitation 
on the use of the constitutional initiative.473 
The state apportionment amendment, which was Issue One on the fall 
2015 ballot,474 sought to reverse an historic Ohio pattern in which the political 
party in power attempted to draw state district lines to benefit it and 
disadvantage its opponent.475 There was strong bipartisan support for 
addressing this problem,476 and the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch 
                                                                                                                     
 471 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.61 (West 2016).  
 472 OHIO CONST. art. XI (amended 2015). 
 473 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)–(C) (adopted in 2015); see also Table of Proposed 
Amendments, supra note 139. 
 474 Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 475 Apportionment and gerrymandering have long been contentious issues in Ohio. See 
generally PETER H. ARGERSINGER, REPRESENTATION AND INEQUALITY IN LATE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2012). The reaction to the gerrymandering of Hamilton 
County was one of the factors that led to the calling of the 1850–1851 Constitutional 
Convention, see supra note 93 and accompanying text, and the barring of gerrymandering 
was one of the accomplishments of the 1851 Constitution. See State ex rel. Herbert v. 
Bricker, 41 N.E.2d 377, 383 (Ohio 1942) (“The objective sought by the [1851] 
constitutional provisions was the prevention of gerrymandering.”). Nonetheless, partisan 
efforts to draw favorable state legislative district (as well as congressional) lines continued 
in Ohio for the balance of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. See 
ARGERSINGER, supra, at 25–26, 45–47, 295 (“In 1903, Ohio amended its constitution to 
mandate malapportionment by guaranteeing each county, regardless of population, at least 
one representative in the lower house.”); see also Kathleen L. Barber, Comment, Partisan 
Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in Ohio and Michigan, 20 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 401 408–09 (1969) (identifying early twentieth century state malapportionment as a 
result of the 1903 Hanna Amendment, which benefited rural portions of the state). Partisan 
attempts to gerrymander state legislative districts continued in Ohio even after the United 
States Supreme Court’s “one man one vote” decisions in the 1960s. See GOLD, supra note 
87, at 423–29; see also Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814, 830 (Ohio 2012) (McGee 
Brown, J., dissenting) (observing that “in 1971, when Democrats controlled the 
apportionment board, they created legislative districts that resulted in their party’s gaining 
control of both houses of the General Assembly, and that in 1981 and 1991, when 
Republicans controlled the board, they created legislative districts that eventually resulted 
in their controlling both houses of the General Assembly”).  
 476 See Jim Siegel, Voters Approve Issue to Reform Ohio’s Redistricting Process, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/public/ 
2015/election/ohio-state-issue-1-redistricting.html [https://perma.cc/3FLC-PV4R]. Issue 
One created a commission to deal with the apportionment of the General Assembly and not 
the federal House of Representatives, which Ohio apportions legislatively. See OHIO 
CONST. art. XI (amended 2015). A companion amendment to give a commission 
responsibility for congressional redistricting was put on hold because of the pendency of 
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Committee devoted all or portions of twelve meetings to it. But the 
apportionment issue did not reach the full Commission, and it only moved to 
the General Assembly because of the bipartisan leadership of two term-limited 
members of the OCMC, who worked with the support of their political parties. 
Ultimately, the House and Senate supported an apportionment plan that 
created a bipartisan Ohio Redistricting Commission and sent an entirely new 
Article XI to the voters. On November 3, 2015, the voters approved the 
amendment by a strong vote of 2,073,563 to 827,971.477 
The antimonopoly amendment, which was Issue Two, sought to make it 
more difficult to initiate constitutional amendments that created monopolies, 
that specified tax rates, or that provided special benefits not available to 
similarly situated persons.478 Concerned about the 2009 initiated amendment 
that resulted in the legalization of casino gambling in four designated 
locations,479 the Constitutional Revision and Updating Committee of the 
OCMC had begun focusing on initiative reform in 2013.480 In early 2015, the 
Committee reviewed the use by other states of limitations on initiatives and a 
draft of an amendment designed to keep off the ballot initiated amendments 
that conferred special benefits that were not generally available to others.481  
Events overtook the OCMC, as proponents of a proposed “investor-
driven” initiated amendment to legalize marijuana for medicinal and personal 
use began to collect signatures and attract public attention.482 The prospect of 
the marijuana proposal (with its alleged monopolistic features)483 being on the 
                                                                                                                     
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, which had the 
potential for banning such commissions. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2015). The Supreme Court upheld the use of 
congressional redistricting commissions. See id. at 2659. The Legislative Branch and 
Executive Branch Committee of the OCMC is considering a proposed amendment to have 
a commission handle congressional redistricting. OCMC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
466, at 10–11. 
 477 See Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 478 See supra notes 312–30 and accompanying text (discussing the antimonopoly 
amendment more fully). 
 479 See OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 6(C)(9)(a)–(d) (designating permissible casino 
gambling sites by parcel numbers in Cleveland, Franklin County, Cincinnati, and Toledo). 
 480 Cf. 2013–2014 OCMC BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 449, at 11. 
 481 See Memorandum from Steven H. Steinglass, Senior Policy Advisor, Ohio 
Constitutional Modernization Comm’n, to the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Comm’n 




 482 See Alan Johnson, Marijuana Legalization Measure Makes Fall Ballot,  
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/ 
2015/08/12/marijuana_ballot_vote.html [https://perma.cc/CP72-3WMQ]. 
 483 Id. The proposed marijuana amendment provided the ten investors in the initiative 
with a strong economic stake that many observers believed represented a monopoly on the 
commercial growth of marijuana in Ohio. See id.; see also Mitch Smith & Sheryl Gay 
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ballot energized many within and outside the General Assembly and led to the 
General Assembly proposing the antimonopoly amendment.484 And on 
November 3, 2015, the voters narrowly approved the antimonopoly 
amendment by a vote of 1,587,060 to 1,489,703.485 
Although the voters approved both Issues One and Two, it is difficult to 
evaluate the contribution of the OCMC. It is clear that the strong bipartisan 
support that “apportionment reform” received in the General Assembly was, in 
large part, a function of the role played by two members of the OCMC, but 
these veteran legislators had political support outside the OCMC to bring this 
long-simmering issue to a conclusion. Likewise, it is also clear that the broad 
support that the proposed antimonopoly amendment received in the General 
Assembly was a function of the efforts of legislators to bring together 
colleagues concerned about not only an abuse of the initiative but also about 
both the underlying issue of marijuana legalization and the monopolistic 
model being advanced. For both Issues One and Two, however, work done by 
committees of the OCMC helped set up the issues for eventual legislative 
consideration. 
Some may view the fact that neither of the proposals made the full journey 
through the OCMC as a failure, but others may see the OCMC, particularly its 
committees, as having played an important role in developing and advancing 
these proposed amendments. What is unclear, however, is whether this is the 
beginning of a new pattern of constitutional revision. Will other proposed 
amendments being considered by the OCMC be presented to the voters before 
the OCMC has fully addressed them?  
What is clear from this limited review is that the OCMC is intimately 
involved with the larger process of constitutional revision, and that the 
legislative members of the OCMC have a special role to play on constitutional 
revision as both members of the OCMC and as legislators. The OCMC may be 
limited by statute to proposing constitutional amendments by a two-thirds 
vote, but its work product (and even its works in progress) may be used by the 
General Assembly even before the work of the OCMC is completed.486 
With the Commission approaching the fifth anniversary of its creation, it 
is difficult to predict what success the OCMC will ultimately have. By the 
comparable five-year mark in the 1970s, the OCRC had already had one 
proposal shot down by the courts, two rejected by the voters, one approved by 
the voters, and two heading for the ballot.487 Thus, despite the initial obstacles 
                                                                                                                     
Stolberg, On Ballot, Ohio Grapples with Specter of Marijuana Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/us/on-ballot-ohio-grapples-with-
specter-of-marijuana-monopoly.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/63AU-V2T7]. 
 484 See supra notes 312–30 and accompanying text (discussing the antimonopoly 
amendment, which amended Article II, § 1e(B)–(C) of the Ohio Constitution and is Ohio’s 
only substantive limitation on the constitutional initiative). 
 485 Table of Proposed Amendments, supra note 139. 
 486 See supra notes 471–86 and accompanying text. 
 487 See supra Part XIV.B. 
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it faced, the OCRC was able to regain its footing and move into its most 
productive period. And the OCMC at a comparable point in its original term is 
only slightly behind the pace set in the 1970s by the OCRC,488 but it is poised 
to catch up. 
XVI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has reviewed the history of constitutional revision in Ohio 
from before statehood to the current effort to use a constitutional revision 
commission to modernize the Ohio Constitution. Hopefully, readers will find 
this to be an interesting though still incomplete story. Clearly, additional 
chapters need to be and will no doubt be written. The OCMC will likely be an 
integral part of the story of twenty-first century constitutional revision in Ohio, 
but the full assessment of its work will have to wait. Meanwhile, the substance 
of forward-looking constitutional revision will continue to be an important 
topic.  
The Symposium held by the Ohio State Law Journal and this Symposium 
issue provide a useful review of many important topics. However, despite the 
quality of this work, none of the articles, including mine, shed a great deal of 
light on the underlying substantive constitutional issues that a conscientious 
Ohio constitution-maker should consider. Still, the topic of constitutional 
revision in Ohio will continue to be of interest, and perhaps the editors of this 
or other journals with an interest in Ohio law, including the Ohio Constitution, 
will facilitate a serious substantive review of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Ohio Constitution.  
                                                                                                                     
 488 The OCRC originally had a ten-year term, but it completed its work two years 
ahead of the deadline. See supra note 384 and accompanying text. Initially, the General 
Assembly gave the OCMC a ten-year term until July 1, 2021, to complete its work. See 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.56 (West 2016). However, in 2015 the state budget bill 
shortened this period by three and one-half years, adopting a January 1, 2018, sunset date 
for the OCMC. See Am. Sub. H.B. 64, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015).  
